The illocutionary component of scalar focus particles
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Abstract This paper presents the new observation that the occurrence of scalar focus particles can be subject to constraints at the level of illocutionary force. Specifically, in the domain of imperative speech acts, the English particle *even* and the German particle *ausgerechnet* are either confined to imperatives that are specially geared to particular precontexts (*even*) or the particles can only occur in negated or insincere imperative speech acts (*ausgerechnet*). As for research on particle elements, the paper adds further support to the idea that focus and discourse particles are closely related categories: not only discourse particles, but also focus particles can restrict the use of an utterance at the level of illocutionary force on the basis of their discourse-anaphoric semantics.

Keywords discourse particles; English; focus particles; German; illocutionary force; imperatives

1 Illocutionary restrictions on particle elements

In many languages, focus particles double as so-called discourse particles (also: modal particles), which are also focus-sensitive and often diachronically derived from focus particles (Zimmermann 2011). Discourse particles are richly attested in Germanic, Slavic, and South East Asian languages (Biberauer et al. 2014; Grosz to appear; Zimmermann 2011). It is controversial whether discourse particles are functionally and/or lexically articulated in Romance (e.g., Cardinaletti 2015; Manzini 2015).

It is well known that the occurrence of discourse particles is restricted by the illocutionary potential of the clauses that contain them. Since the particles make a semantic contribution by co-determining the illocutionary force of an utterance, they are geared to certain clause types (declarative, polar interrogative, wh-interrogative, exclamative, imperative, etc.) and arise mainly in root clauses. Observe the following contrast, showing that the particle *denn* (lit. ‘then’) can only occur in interrogatives (1a,b) and not, for instance, in imperatives (1c):

(1) a. Wo fährt er denn hin?
   where travels he PART to
   ‘Where is he traveling to? (I am wondering.)’

   b. Ist er denn nach Berlin gefahren?
   is he PART to Berlin traveled
   ‘Did he travel to Berlin? (I am wondering.)’

   c. *Fahr denn nach Berlin!
   travel PART to Berlin
   ‘Travel to Berlin!’

The particle *denn* expresses an attitude of wondering and being concerned on the part of the speaker (for semantic details on *denn*, see recent work by Csipak and Zobel 2014 and Theiler 2017). According to the literature, one component of expressing this attitude is that *denn* indicates that the reason for posing the question can be found in the current discourse context. To illustrate, let us look at König’s (1977: 119) famous example (‘#’ indicates systematic pragmatic deviance):
(2) A weckt B und fragt (‘A wakes up B and asks’)
   A: # Wie spät ist es denn?
   how late is it PART
   ‘What time is it? (I am wondering.)’

The example in (2) illustrates that questions featuring denn are infelicitous when the addressee (i.e., Speaker B) lacks a context in which to interpret the question. This already indicates that discourse particles are not only confined to different clause types and their general illocutionary potential. Rather, the use of discourse particles is also restricted to certain illocutionary subtypes within the same clause type.

One illustrative case that brings out this property even more clearly and that will play a central role in this paper is the (in)compatibility of particle elements with different types of imperative speech acts. There is some work on the felicity of particle elements in imperatives in the domain of discourse particles (see Schwager 2010; Grosz 2011a on German; and Davis 2009 on Japanese). Consider the following examples featuring the German discourse particles ruhig (lit. ‘quiet’) and bloß (lit. ‘only’); paraphrases of the particles’ meaning contributions are adopted from Schwager (2010) and Grosz (2011a):

(3) a. Fahr ruhig nach Berlin! Keine Sorge!
   travel PART to Berlin no worries
   ‘Just travel to Berlin, no worries!’
   b. # Hörst Du? Fahr ruhig nach Berlin! Sonst wirst Du bestraft!
   hear you travel PART to Berlin or else will be you punished
   ‘Do you hear me? Travel to Berlin! Or else you’ll be punished.’

(4) a. # Fahr bloß nach Berlin! Keine Sorge!

While the particle ruhig can be used in PERMISSIONS or RECOMMENDATIONS (3a), it is infelicitous in COMMANDS or WARNINGS (3b). The reverse holds for the particle bloß, as illustrated in (4).

As already mentioned at the outset of this section, many discourse particles (e.g., bloß above) have homophonous counterparts in the inventory of focus particles. However, focus particles, in contrast to discourse particles, do not display illocutionary restrictions like the ones we illustrated above for discourse particles (e.g., König 1991; Beck 2016). However, it is fair to say that no systematic attention has been paid so far to the occurrence of focus particles in different kinds of speech acts (Iatridou and Tatevosov 2016 is a recent exception). In what follows, I will focus on the use of focus particles in imperatives and deal with the new observation that the occurrence of scalar focus particles can be subject to constraints at the level of illocutionary force.

In this paper, I will focus on two particular particles: English even (only ‘unlikelihood’ reading, to be specified below) and German ausgerechnet (lit. ‘calculated’, similar to English ‘of all x’). Illocutionary restrictions like the ones demonstrated in this paper may hold for further focus particles, but these two particles are particularly interesting because their meanings are in conflict with two different (and central) felicity conditions of imperatives that have been claimed in the literature concerned with modelling the illocutionary force of imperatives (in particular by Kaufmann 2012). I will argue that the following two paradigms hold when we look at possibilities of how these two particles can be used in imperatives. I provide two separate tables here because I will claim that the particles have an impact on two different felicity conditions of the imperative:
the *Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint* (EUC) and the *Ordering Source Restriction* (OSR). Accordingly, the contexts that are relevant to show these two different constellations are also different ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>even and EUC</th>
<th>– precontext</th>
<th>+ precontext</th>
<th>+ negation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>even</td>
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*Table 1. Proposed paradigm for even in different contexts.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ausgerechnet and OSR</th>
<th>– negation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ausgerechnet</td>
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*Table 2. Proposed paradigm for ausgerechnet in different contexts.*

Table 1 summarizes the observations to be detailed below. In a nutshell, *even* is only felicitous in imperatives when a relevant precontext is given (I will explain this below) or when the imperative is negated (in this case, I will claim that it is no longer the *even* relevant to our discussion). The particle *ausgerechnet*, on the other hand, is only felicitous in insincere imperatives and, like in the case of *even*, in negated imperative speech acts. Taken together, this paradigm can be explained, as I will argue in this paper, by referring to well-known felicity conditions of imperatives: the EUC and the OSR. Accordingly, focus particles can be subject to constraints at the level of illocutionary force, lending support to the idea that focus and discourse particles are closely related categories: not only discourse particles, but also focus particles can restrict the use of an utterance at the level of illocutionary force on the basis of their discourse-anaphoric semantics.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will focus on English *even* and introduce the main observations for the occurrence of *even* in imperatives (Section 2.1). Based on this characterization of the distribution of this particle, I will provide a detailed formal analysis of how to derive this particular distribution, and I will demonstrate that the observations in Section 2.1 are indeed due to conflicts at the level of illocutionary force. Section 3 then discusses the German particle *ausgerechnet* and first introduces the main data of its (non)occurrence in imperative speech acts (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, similar to what I have demonstrated for English *even*, I will show that the paradigm for German *ausgerechnet* in imperatives can be formally derived by means of meaning components of the imperative speech act that concern its illocutionary force. Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper by again highlighting the close similarity of focus and discourse particles.

## 2 Imperatives and the focus particle *even*

The literature on *even* is one of the richest and most detailed literature in the field of research on focus particles (for comprehensive overviews, see Crnič 2011a; Giannakidou 2007). However, while the presuppositions of this particular particle have been investigated by many scholars, it has not been explored in depth to what extent the use of *even* differs in different speech acts. In
what follows, I will argue for the following claim: In most cases, the presuppositions of *even* (to be analyzed below) can be satisfied by a following context. In imperative speech acts, however, the presuppositions of *even* cannot be satisfied by a following context. Instead, the use of *even* requires a specific precontext in these cases. Let us first turn to the relevant examples before I demonstrate how these observations can be accounted for at the illocutionary level of imperatives.

### 2.1 The core distribution of *even* in imperatives

Look at the following example, which seems pragmatically deviant when uttered out of the blue, no matter if the following context dovetails nicely with the unlikelihood reading that is associated with *even* in this case (capitals indicate focal stress):

(5) # Come even to the JAZZ event! I know you don’t like jazz, but all concert events at Davies Symphony Hall are great!

In contrast, imperatives containing *even* that are preceded by a context like the following in (6B) are totally fine:

(6) A: I’ll try to get a ticket at the box office tonight. I think I’ll go to Davies Symphony Hall one hour before the performance.  
B: Be there even TWO hours before it starts! Keith Jarrett is famous – a lot of people will ask for remaining tickets!

But why is that the case? Traditionally, *even* has been claimed to feature the following two presuppositions (Karttunen and Peters 1979): (i) an existential presupposition (7b) requiring that at least one focus alternative in the domain of *even* that is not identical to the alternative expressed by the original sentence holds true, and (ii) a scalar presupposition (7c) expressing that the value

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1 The only place (to my knowledge) where this pragmatic deviance is mentioned too is a recent BA thesis that has been published by Yale University in 2017. Martin (2017: 3) provides one relevant example:

(i) # Love even [your mother].

… and states that “[i]t is difficult to find natural-sounding imperatives containing either meaning of *even*. The reason for this is unknown and outside the scope of this paper, but is certainly worth further exploration.” I agree.

2 I should point out that this presupposition is not uncontroversial. For instance, Collins (2016: 7) gives the following example in a recent paper: ‘A dog food company is developing a new dog food. The product is ready for testing. No dog has ever tasted it before. Now, I have a dog named Rover. I decide to feed the new product to him to see if he likes it. When I feed it to him, he gobbles it up. This is strange to me, since Rover is very picky. He doesn’t like any food at all really.’ Collins points out that in this situation one could say:

(i) I predict this dog food will be very popular. Even Rover likes it.

There is no existential presupposition in this case because no dog other than Rover has ever eaten this dog food. However, since the reasoning of this paper does not hinge on this particular presupposition, I will disregard these complications.
of the even phrase is to be placed at the lowest end on a scale of likelihood.

(7)  a. Keith even played Over the RAINbow!
    b. ∃x [x ≠ Over the Rainbow ∧ C(x) ∧ played (Keith, x)]
    c. ∀x [x ≠ Over the Rainbow → likelihood (Keith playing x) > likelihood (Keith playing Over the Rainbow)]

I will argue that the infelicity of even in imperatives without relevant precontext is due to the combination of both presuppositions, which, however, will be qualified further below. However, there is good reason to hypothesize that the pragmatic deviance we see in (5) cannot be explained by either of the two meaning contributions of even alone (7) because then we would expect that even is excluded from any speech act that is uttered without a relevant precontext. This is not what we find.

My claim is that in principle all other kinds of clause types and speech acts, respectively, are compatible with both the additive and the unlikelihood presupposition of even intended in (5); in these cases, as mentioned above, the presuppositions of even can easily be accommodated by a following discourse and do not require preceding discourse contexts like in (6) above.

(8)  a. Keith even played Over the RAINbow! He hasn’t played that song for years!
    b. Why are you coming even to the JAZZ event? I know you don’t like any sophisticated music, and Jazz can be very experimental.
    c. Has Keith even played Over the RAINbow? He hasn’t played that song for years!

While it should be uncontroversial that one can use even in declaratives (7a), wh-questions (7b), and polar questions (7c) when a relevant context follows the utterance, even can also frequently be found in exclamatives; here are some examples lacking a specific precontext (collected by simple Google searches):

(9)  a. What a beautiful topper even in blue and the fact that it holds a special value to you is just an added bonus!4
    b. Seeley Lake Provincial Park: what a beautiful spot even in winter5

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3 Of course, it is open for discussion whether additives in general (i.e., not only even, but also of too, for instance) can easily be accommodated without a salient and/or explicitly mentioned precontext. Although recent experimental evidence suggests that additive particles are not as bad as predicted in ‘neutral contexts’ (see Grubic and Wierzba 2019; Grubic 2019), there are many controversies in the literature over this issue (see Geurts and van der Sandt 2004; Ruys 2015 for different accounts and Beaver and Zeevat 2007 for an overview). The present paper cannot decide between all these different approaches, but merely claims that the differences we see between ((5) = even in imperatives without precontext), ((6) = even in imperatives with precontext), and ((8) = even in other speech acts without precontext)) cannot be explained by salience requirements that have been proposed in the literature on other additives.

4 Source: http://www.weddingbycolor.com/hismrsreid/wedding-cake-topper-has-arrived-136886

5 Source: https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g1207923-d5005014-r249887732-Seeley_Lake_Provincial_Park-Hazelton_Kitimat_Stikine_District_British_Columbia.html
c. What a beautiful truck even with the monster bunk.⁶

I thus hypothesize that the pragmatic deviance in (5) can only be explained by referring to the interplay of pragmatic properties that are distinct of imperative speech acts and the semantics of even (and not only be referring to the semantics of even alone when even is used without any precontext).

As a final point, and to further support the hypothesis that the pragmatic deviance in (5) is imperative-specific, let us briefly highlight that (5) cannot be explained by referring to a general factuality/evidentiality implicature associated with even.

To see this, consider (7a) again. The use of even in this example implicates that the speaker has evidence that Keith played the song Over the Rainbow. It is well known that factual/evidential elements cannot occur in imperatives because they express that the speaker has evidence for the prejacent proposition $p$, while, at the same time, the speaker wants $p$ to come about. Observe, for example, the case of evaluative adverbs:

(10) #Come surprisingly to the JAZZ event!

However, such factual/evidential elements are claimed to be ruled out also in questions (e.g., Ernst 2007 and many others). Here is the classical example by Bellert (1977: 343):

(11) #Has John surprisingly arrived?

Since even can in fact occur in such questions (8c), there must be another reason for why even is pragmatically deviant without an appropriate preceding discourse in (5) – and this reason must lie in the specific meaning contribution of the imperative speech act.

2.2 How to derive even in imperatives

For the analysis of the meaning contribution of imperatives, I adopt the theory by Kaufmann (2012, 2016), who builds on the connections between imperatives and modalized declaratives and aims at modeling the illocutionary force of imperatives. To this end, Kaufmann suggests a set of presuppositions that are uniquely associated with imperatives qua clause type. In a nutshell, these presuppositions serve as felicity conditions preventing imperatives from being used in contexts in which corresponding modalized declaratives would be used descriptively (for overviews of other prominent approaches to imperatives, see Han 2011; Portner 2016).

The choice of this particular theory is motivated by two issues. On the one hand, Portner’s (2007, 2016) account makes essential reference to the addressee and has thus been criticized for disregarding wish-type uses that have no addressee (Please, stop raining for once!). As far as I can

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⁶ Source: http://forums.aths.org/PrintTopic105910.aspx

⁷ I am aware of the fact that there is some recent discussion on the acceptability of such examples, especially in Romance languages (Mayol and Castroviejo 2013). However, as for the languages to be discussed in this paper (English and German), I take examples such as (11) to constitute a quite robust pattern. Further cross-linguistic verification of my claims must await future research.
tell, these cases fare no better with even (Please, stop raining even for once! can only be uttered with the ‘at least’ reading of even and not with the unlikelihood reading illustrated in Section 2.1 above). Hence, those cases should also be included in our explanation. On the other hand, Han (1998 et seq.) does not provide an account of how the modal component and the force component interact in discourse, and thus her account is lacking a definition of the pragmatic properties of imperatives that are of interest to us in this paper.

That being said, let us now look at one of Kaufmann’s (2012) presuppositions in more detail because I claim that this particular presupposition and those of even introduced in Section 2.1 above cannot be satisfied simultaneously.

Kaufmann introduces the Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC) because she observes that issuing an imperative \( \phi \) is infelicitous if the speaker is sure that \( \phi \) is going to happen or will not happen, as shown in (12); example and judgments by Kaufmann (2012: 156):

(12) # Ich weiß, dass du das auf {jeden/keinen} Fall tun wirst, also tu’s auch.
   ‘I know that you are (not) going to do this no matter what, so do it also.’

EUC refers to the speaker’s expectations prior to his use of the imperative. This constraint does not rule out that a speaker is convinced that his imperative will be obeyed, and that the epistemic uncertainty is thus removed by the use of the imperative. This state of expectations is captured by the presuppositional details of EUC (Kaufmann 2012: 157; ‘Bel’ maps the speaker S and a world \( w \) to the set of worlds constituting the speaker’s belief set in \( w \); Bel’ is a version that also takes into account a time argument \( T \)):

(13) The precontext \( c’ \) of \( c \) is such that for all \( w \in CS(c’) \):
   \[
   (\exists w’ \in Bel_{c'}(c’)(w))(\exists w'' \in Bel_{c'}(c’)(w)][\neg p(t)(w’) \& p(t)(w'')]
   \]
 (= the speaker believes that both \( \neg p \) and \( p \) are possible).

For a version of our key example (5) without even, we can thus incorporate this felicity condition as follows:

(14) a. Come to the JAZZ event!
   b. If defined, \[[IMP [you come to the jazz concert]]]_{c'}(w) = 1 \text{ iff for the precontext } c' \text{ of } c,
      \[
      CS(c') \subseteq \lambda w.(\exists w' \in Bel_{c'}(c')(w))(\exists w'' \in Bel_{c'}(c')(w)][\neg p(t)(w') \& p(t)(w'')]
      \]
   c. # Come to the JAZZ event! But you won’t.

For the semantics of even in a declarative, I adopt the following analysis by Crnič (2011a,b), where the particle takes clausal scope at LF (15b) and associates with the focused element Over the Rainbow. (15c) spells out the additive and unlikelihood presupposition and represents the assertive meaning that Keith played Over the Rainbow.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) I am aware of the rich literature showing that in the presence of an explicit precontext, even can operate on different scales (not only on a scale of likelihood); see Kay (1990); Greenberg (2016, 2017); Beaver and Clark (2008); and many others. However, in what follows I will make the natural assumption that without context, even typically operates on a scale of likelihood. At this point of the paper, I will thus abstract away from additional cases and stick to the more
(15) a. Keith even played *Over the RAINbow*!
    
    b. [even C1] [Keith played [*Over the Rainbow*]]
    
    c. \[\langle (15a) \rangle^{\alpha,\beta}(w)\] is defined only if \(\exists q \in \{\text{that Keith played } x \mid x \text{ is a relevant entity}\}: \text{that Keith played *Over the Rainbow*} \lessdot_{\text{likely}} q\). If defined, \(\lbrack Xb\rbrack^{\alpha,\beta}(w) = 1\) iff Keith played *Over the Rainbow* in \(w\).

Based on the data discussed in Section 2.1 above, I claim that the following analysis can explain why *even* in imperatives is pragmatically deviant without a relevant precontext:

(16) a. # Come even to the JAZZ event!
    
    b. \(\lbrack(16a)\rbrack^{\alpha,\beta}(w)\) is defined only if \(\exists q \in \{\text{that you come to } x \mid x \text{ is a relevant location}\}: \text{that you come to the jazz event} \lessdot_{\text{likely}} q\). If defined, 
    
    \(\lbrack(16a)\rbrack^{\alpha,\beta}(w) = 1\) iff for the precontext \(c'\) of \(c\),
    
    (i) \(CS(c') \subseteq \lambda w. (\exists w' \in Bel_{\lambdachild} (c' \gamma)(w))(\exists w'' \in Bel_{\lambdachild} (c' \gamma)(w)) [-p(t)(w') \& p(t)(w'')]\)
    
    (ii) in \(c'\) it is already salient that \(q\) is already obtained or is likely to obtain,
    
    (iii) in \(c'\) \(\text{Exp}_{\lambdachild}(p) > 0\)

Note that the two felicity conditions in (ii) and (iii) only hold for utterances with *even* in imperatives because, as we have seen in Section 2.1, *even* can be felicitously used in other speech acts without such a precontext. Let me explain the two conditions added by *even* (i.e., (ii) and (iii)) and their interplay with the general condition of imperatives (i) in more detail: Condition (ii) is the characterization of the precontext that is brought about by the use of *even* and its two presuppositions introduced in Section 2.1 and spelled out in (15) above, and condition (iii) is a consequence of (ii) in terms of the speaker’s expectation how likely it is that \(p\) will come about.\footnote{In particular, *even* adds to the imperative that there is an alternative to \(p\) that is already obtained or likely to obtain, and *even* now adds \(p\) to the relevant set of alternatives. If this is the case, then the speaker’s expectation for \(p\) (\(\text{Exp}_{\lambdachild}(p)\)) cannot be plain zero, but rather it must already be \(> 0\) because relevant (although more likely) alternatives to \(p\) have already been obtained.}

In this sense, the particle *even*, when used in an imperative, modifies Kaufmann’s (2012) felicity condition (i). This condition has been proposed by Kaufmann because, according to her approach, the precontext in a sincere imperative must be such that the speaker still believes that both \(-p\) and \(p\) are possible, meaning that it has not already been decided whether \(-p\) or \(p\) will come about (cf. our example (14c) above: *Come to the JAZZ event! But you won’t*). The particle *even* now adds to the precontext requirements that it has indeed already been decided that \(p\) is more likely to come about than \(-p\) because a relevant alternative \(q\) has already been obtained or is very likely to obtain (because the alternative \(q\) is presupposed to be likely to come about due to the likelihood presupposition of *even*). The two felicity conditions (ii) and (iii) are thus a consequence of both the additive and the likelihood presupposition of *even*.

\footnote{Here I adopt recent proposals by Kelsey (2019) and Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) who model different degrees of speakers’ expectation for a proposition in terms of their credence level in \(p\). The formal tools of this type of work provide means to factor in (and measure) different degrees of expectations into the semantic analyses of phenomena where expectation scales play a crucial role (mirativity, exclamatives, but also, as in our case, scalar focus particles like *even*).}
An important piece of evidence for this claim that *even* indeed imposes extra restrictions on the precontext that have an impact on the felicity condition (i) of the imperative is that when a speaker issues an imperative in a context where he expects that it is very unlikely (or close to impossible) to obtain \( p \) (i.e., \( \exp_S(p) \approx 0 \)), we only get the reading of so-called ‘weak’ *even* (‘at least’), and those imperatives are accompanied by a distinct bias that has been described as the ‘low probability bias’ in work on *even* with desires (Crnič 2011b):

(17) a. Please, stop raining even for once!
   b. reading: ‘it should stop raining at least for once’ and \( \exp_S(p) \approx 0 \)
   c. # reading: ‘it should stop raining \( n \) times’ >likely ‘it should stop raining for once’

In other words, if the imperative is uttered in a context where \( \exp_S(p) \approx 0 \) (like in desires and wish-type uses (17)), there is no way to get the unlikelihood reading of *even* paraphrased in (17c). On the other hand, if *even* is used in an imperative with a precontext that already makes clear that \( q \) is already obtained or is likely to obtain, resulting in an expectation situation \( \exp_{cS}(p) > 0 \), then the use of unlikelihood *even* is perfectly fine. To see this, observe our key example from Section 2.1 again, repeated here for convenience:

(18) A: I’ll try to get a ticket at the box office tonight. I think I’ll go to Davies Symphony Hall one hour before the performance.
   B: Be there even TWO hours before it starts! Keith Jarrett is famous – a lot of people will ask for remaining tickets!

In this case, all relevant requirements for the precontext \( c’ \) and thus all felicity conditions of using *even* in the imperative are met:

(19) a. **PRECONTEXT** \( c’ \): I’ll try to get a ticket at the box office tonight. I think I’ll go to Davies Symphony Hall one hour before the performance.
   **Be there even TWO hours before it starts!**
   b. \([[(19a)]^{g,c}(w)]\) is defined only if \( \exists q \in \{ \text{that you are there } n \text{ hours before it starts} \mid n \in \mathbb{N} \leq 2 \} \): you are there two hours before it starts \( \leq \text{likely } q \). If defined, \([[(19a)]^{g,c}(w)] = 1 \) iff for the precontext \( c’ \) of \( c \),
   (i) \( CS(c') \subseteq \lambda w. (\exists w' \in Bel'_{cS}(c'\gamma(w)) (\exists w'' \in Bel'_{cS}(c'\gamma(w)) [\neg p(t)(w') \& p(t)(w'')]) \)
   (ii) in \( c' \) it is already salient that \( q \) is already obtained or is likely to obtain.
   (iii) in \( c' \) \( \exp_{cS}(p) > 0 \)

In (19), it is salient in the precontext that the addressee is willing to obtain \( q \) (being at the venue one hour before the performance); therefore, it is likely that the alternative \( q \) will be obtained (condition (ii)). As a consequence, the precontext is such that \( \exp_{cS}(p) > 0 \) (condition (iii)), while, at the same time, the speaker still believes that both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are possible (condition (i)).

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10 In (18), Speaker B is correcting Speaker A’s expectations that he has regarding purchasing a ticket. In an advice use of imperatives such as (18B), the speaker is an epistemic authority on ways to achieve a certain goal, and, in our case, Speaker B knows perfectly well that one has to be two hours earlier at the venue to get some tickets. Accordingly, Speaker B does not rank this fact as particularly unlikely or surprising to himself (actually, the opposite is true). The reason
Note in this context that *even* is perfectly fine in disjunctive imperatives, which always introduce at least one focus alternative into the active context; these data further support the claim spelled out in the analysis above. Here are some authentic examples:

(20)  
   a. Come for a one-day trip or stay **even** longer!\(^{11}\)  
   b. Spend some of your time working on a fun craft project like ornaments, wreaths, **or** go **even** further and learn to knit a blanket.\(^{12}\)

It is easy to see that such constellations can be explained by our analysis given above: all three felicity conditions of using *even* in imperatives are met.

A final datapoint that can now be accounted for by our analysis above is that *even* without precontexts as defined in (16) and (19) above is perfectly fine in negated imperatives:

(21)  
   a. Please don’t take **even** one moment for granted. Don’t overlook a single smile [...]\(^{13}\)  
   b. Please don’t let **even** a fraction of what happened to me, happen to you.\(^{14}\)

(…)

However, in the case of *even* in negated imperatives, the prejacent proposition is not the least likely, but rather the most likely alternative. That is, in example (21a), for instance, ‘taking one moment for granted’ is more likely than ‘taking *n* moments for granted’. In order to derive this reading, I will adopt the general approach that *even* in this ‘most likely’ reading is actually a different lexical item (a ‘NPI-*even*’, see Giannakidou 2007; in what follows: *even*\(^2\)).\(^{15}\)

(22)  
   a. Please don’t take **even**\(^2\) one moment for granted!  
   b. \[\text{[(22a)]}^{g,c}(w) \text{ is defined only if } \exists q \in \{\text{that you take *n* moments for granted}\} : \text{that you take one moment for granted} \succ_{\text{likely}} q.\]

Given the ‘most likely’ semantics of *even*\(^2\) in (22b), *even*\(^2\) may be subject to different licensing conditions in imperatives and/or may not impact the felicity conditions (= the precontext requirements of the imperative) at all. We can thus disregard *even*\(^2\) as a candidate where the

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\(^{11}\) Source: [https://www.raseborgsguider.info/in_english](https://www.raseborgsguider.info/in_english)  
\(^{12}\) Source: [https://lakeforestseniorliving.com/blog/2017/12/beat-the-winter-blues](https://lakeforestseniorliving.com/blog/2017/12/beat-the-winter-blues)  
\(^{13}\) Source: [http://thehealingbreath.org/2015/05/13/of-course-i-dont-resent-you](http://thehealingbreath.org/2015/05/13/of-course-i-dont-resent-you)  
\(^{15}\) Another prominent approach postulates that *even* may covertly move above negation (see Lahiri 1998 and more recent work by Crnič 2011a). I will (and cannot) decide between these two general camps here, but merely refer to their shared claim that the presupposition of *even* with negation comes out as ‘most likely’ (be it compositionally or by lexical means). The reason why I follow Giannakidou (2007) and others in postulating that *even* in English is an ambiguous lexical item is that my native language, too, features separate lexical items corresponding to negative and positive contexts of *even* (e.g., German *wenigstens, nicht einmal* vs. *sogar, selbst*); see Schwarz (2005) and Gast (2017).
presupposition(s) of a focus particle have an impact on the felicity conditions of an illocutionary act. The same might hold for other lexical items that do not feature the same presuppositions as ‘unlikelihood’ even (see ‘weak’ even in example (17) above).

However, in the next section I will discuss another focus particle that is clearly restricted in its occurrence with imperatives at the illocutionary level: German ausgerechnet.

3 Imperatives and the focus particle ausgerechnet

German is a language featuring a rich inventory of focus-sensitive particles, and most of them have been investigated thoroughly from a cross-linguistic perspective in semantics (see König 1991 and Jacobs 1983 for seminal studies and Hole 2015 and Zimmermann 2017 for recent investigations). One of these particles is German ausgerechnet (lit. ‘calculated’), which is a scalar focus particle expressing the meaning of English ‘of all x’ (i.e., constructions like of all persons, of all things, etc.). In the current literature it is pointed out that the only three languages that feature focus particles expressing this particular interpretation are German, Dutch (uitgerekend), and Hebrew (davka/אקווד; see König (2017)). Let us look at the following example:

(23) Er ist ausgerechnet zum Konzert von Keith Jarrett gegangen.
he isPART to.the.concert of Keith Jarrett gone
‘Of all concerts, he went to the concert by Keith Jarrett.’

There are two main differences between our ‘unlikelihood’ even in Section 2 above and ausgerechnet. First, while even is additive/inclusive, ausgerechnet, like the expression ‘of all x’ is exclusive; see (23). In other words, inclusive even presupposes that all focus alternatives are true, while exclusive ausgerechnet presupposes that all focus alternatives are false. Let me hasten to add that, as is the case with even (see FN2 above), one could come up with examples showing that not all cases of association with ausgerechnet are exclusive in this sense and that the exclusive component of ausgerechnet is in fact much weaker than that of, for example, only.16 However, the seminal literature on this topic draws this distinction (e.g., König 1981), and it is certainly fair to say that the prototypical use of these particles is inclusive on the one hand (even/sogar etc.) and exclusive on the other hand (ausgerechnet).

Second, I will adopt the seminal observation and analysis by König (1981) and claim that ausgerechnet typically is evaluative and characterizes the focus associate as a non-optimal choice;

16 Consider the following example:

(i) Hans ging zu einer Party und hat neben vielen alten Freunden ausgerechnet (auch)
Hans went to a party and has among many old friends PART (also)
seine Exfreundin getroffen!
his ex-girlfriend met
‘Hans went to a party and, among many old friends, he met his ex-girlfriend (of all guests)!’

While it would be impossible for exclusive nur (‘only’) to associate with the focus constituent seine Exfreundin (‘his ex-girlfriend’) in this example, ausgerechnet is perfectly acceptable in this context.
that is, the speaker and/or hearer prefers any other situation than the one expressed by $p$ (according to König 2017 and many others). This is clearly stated in the classic analysis by König (1981: 121):

(24)  German *ausgerechnet*:

a. $\langle$ausgerechnet, a, $\langle$λ, x $\langle$a,P$\rangle \rangle$  

b. $(\exists x) (x$ prefers $(y,P)$ to $(a,P)$ for all alternatives $y$ under consideration

By ‘typically evaluative’, I mean that in the presence of a relevant explicit precontext, *ausgerechnet*, just like the particle *even* (see FN 8) could also operate on different scales (not only on a preference scale). However, in what follows I follow the traditional characterization that without such a context, *ausgerechnet* typically presupposes such a preference component.

It is easy to bring out the evaluative component of German *ausgerechnet*. For instance, *ausgerechnet* turns a polar question into a biased question that conveys a negative evaluation of an affirmative answer. The following example by König (1991: 20) makes this very clear:

(25) Willst du *ausgerechnet* jetzt verreisen?  
want you PART now go.away  
‘Of all moments, you want to go away now? (You’re acting irresponsibly!’)

In the next section, I will demonstrate that while *ausgerechnet* can occur in assertions (23) and questions (25), this particle cannot occur in imperative speech acts.

### 3.1 The core distribution of *ausgerechnet* in imperatives

The core observation is that ausgerechnet, just like *even* in Section 2, cannot occur in imperative speech acts like (26), even if the following context dovetails nicely with the unlikelihood reading that is associated with *ausgerechnet* and has already been mentioned in (23) above.

(26) # Komm *ausgerechnet* zum JAZZkonzert!  
come PART to.the jazz.concert  
‘Of all events, come to the jazz concert!’  
(Ich weiß, Du magst keinen Jazz, aber Jazzkonzerte sind das einzige, was sich in der Davies Symphony Hall wirklich lohnt! ‘I know you don’t like jazz, but jazz concerts are the only thing that’s worth a visit at Davies Symphony Hall!’)

As we have also observed for *even* in Section 2 above, the use of this particle in other sentence types is perfectly fine:

(27) a. Er ist *ausgerechnet* zum JAZZkonzert gegangen.  
he is PART to.the jazz.concert gone  
‘Of all events, he went to the jazz concert.’  
(Obwohl er die anderen Musikstile viel besser findet! ‘Even though he likes the other styles of music much more!’)
b. Warum ist er ausgerechnet zum JAZZkonzert gegangen?
   ‘Of all events, why did he go to the jazz concert?’
   (Er mag die anderen Musikstile viel mehr! ‘He likes the other styles of music much more!’)

Additionally, we observe that ausgerechnet is perfect in negated imperatives. Observe the following example from Pożlewicz (2006: 180), based on a corpus of German newspapers:

(28) Nimm nicht ausgerechnet den schwarzen Pulli mit!
   ‘Of all things, don’t take the black pullover with you!’

As a last data point, we observe that ausgerechnet is totally fine in ‘insincere’ imperatives; look at the following example:

(29) Klar, nimm ausgerechnet einen feuchten Lappen! So verschmierst Du dann den Dreck! Ganz toll!
   ‘(Ironic:) Of course, use a damp cloth (of all things)! This way, you’ll smear the dirt around! Well done!

I will elaborate on the notion of insincerity in a context like this in Section 3.2. At this point, it suffices to see that these utterances often come with a flavor of frustration and disinterest, which can be emphasized by dedicated discourse markers like klar (ironic ‘of course’); see (29).

With these core observations in place, we can now turn to the analysis of the focus particle ausgerechnet in imperative speech acts.

3.2 How to derive ausgerechnet in imperatives

To derive the incompatibility of ausgerechnet with non-negated imperatives, I will refer to a second central presupposition that Kaufmann (2012) has proposed for imperative speech acts: the Ordering Source Restriction (OSR). Look at her following example, which illustrates a felicitous use of an imperative:

(30) a. Be home at 5!
    b. Those alternatives that are most plausible according to what I take to be the usual course of events, are such that you are at home at 5.

In this case, it is absolutely coherent that the speaker believes that both p and ¬p are possible (EUC), see Section 2.2 above, while, at the same time, he believes that p is a necessity with respect to what is most plausible or the usual course of events. Given examples of this kind, Kaufmann
concludes that what is additionally involved when (30a) is uttered felicitously is a non-empty ordering source in the sense of Kratzer (1991, 2012), and that this ordering source is usually modeled according to preferences and goals, respectively, in imperative cases. This is captured by the (OSR); see Kaufmann (2012: 160):

(31) Either (i) in $c$ there is a salient decision problem $\Delta^c \subseteq \mathcal{P}(W)$ such that in $c$ the imperative provides an answer to it, $g$ is any prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee consider $g$ the relevant criteria for resolving $\Delta^c$; or else, (ii) in $c$ there is no salient decision problem $\Delta^c$ such that the imperative provides an answer to it in $c$, and $g$ is speaker bouletic.

Kaufmann discusses examples demonstrating that in many cases the ordering source is mutually accepted by both the speaker and the addressee (hence the notion of a common salient decision problem). However, crucial in our context is that OSR expresses that either the ordering of preferences/goals ($= g$) is mutually shared by speaker and hearer, or $g$ is only accepted on the part of the speaker (i.e., wish-type uses). Accordingly, it is never possible that the ordering of preferences is determined by the hearer only.

In the case where $g$ is determined from the perspective of the hearer only, and the speaker thus does not share $g$, we observe a pragmatically deviant form in the sense that this constellation results in an insincere way of speaking, often featuring ‘a confrontational flavor’, as Kaufmann (2012: 161) puts it. Consider example (40):\(^{17}\)

(32) Dann geh eben auf diese verdammte Party. Ich kann dich ja eh nicht
   then go PART to this damn party I can you PART PART not
   hindern.
   impede
   ‘Well, then go to that damn party. I cannot keep you from doing so anyways.’

The OSR thus ensures that a felicitous and sincere use of the imperative excludes cases where the orderings of preferences/goals of the speaker and the hearer considerably diverge, and the imperative operates on the ordering determined by the hearer only (see also Condoravdi and Lauer’s 2012: 41-43 remarks on CONCESSIONS).

Coming back to our cases of imperative already introduced in Section 3.1 above, we thus have to include a preference relation among propositions in our denotation of the imperative. To do this, I will assume that such a relation can be defined on the basis of a preference relation among worlds and adopt the proposal by Crnić (2011a: 74-76) who refers to von Wright (1963: 31) for the general idea:

\(^{17}\) The following German example contains the discourse particles *eben, ja, and eh*. These particles all convey that the proposition is rather uncontroversial or even self-evident. In contexts like (40), the speaker can use these particles to additionally emphasize both the resignation and frustration of his utterance (i.e., he already takes it as uncontroversial and unchangeable that his and the hearer’s preferences/goals diverge considerably and that he will have no real impact on the hearer’s actions). Note that this insincere use of imperatives is also totally fine with *ausgerechnet* (see our detailed discussion further below): *Dann geh eben ausgerechnet auf diese verdammte Party!*
The maximal similarity function is defined in Crnić (2011a) according to Lewis (1973):

\[(34) \quad \text{SIM}(\leq, w, p) \equiv_{df} \lambda w'. p(w') = 1 \land \forall w''(p(w'') = 1 \rightarrow w' \leq w w'')\]

In what follows, I will leave the similarity relation \(\leq\) out of the analysis. The imperative in (35) thus has the meaning in (35b). That is, given the speaker’s preferences, it is better that you come to the jazz concert than that you don’t come to the jazz concert:

\[(35) \quad \text{a.} \quad \text{Komm zum JAZZkonzert!} \text{ come to the jazz concert} \]

\[\text{b. If defined, } \preceq_c(\text{you come to the jazz concert}) = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{cs(c): SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you come to the jazz concert}) \geq_{sp(c), w} \text{SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you don’t come to the jazz concert}) \]

With this semantic component of the imperative in place, we can now see why the particle \textit{ausgerechnet} is incompatible with such a speech act:

\[(36) \quad \text{a. } \# \text{Komm ausgerechnet zum JAZZkonzert!} \text{ come PART to the jazz concert} \]

\[\text{b. } \preceq_c(\text{w}) \text{ is defined only if} \]

\[(i) \quad \forall w' \in \text{cs(c): SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you come to the jazz concert}) \geq_{sp(c), w} \text{SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you don’t come to the jazz concert}) \quad (\text{OSR}) \]

\[\text{b. } \preceq_c(\text{w}) \text{ is defined only if} \]

\[(ii) \quad \forall w' \in \text{cs(c): SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you come to the jazz concert}) \leq_{sp(c), w} \text{SIM}(w', \text{cs(c}) \land \text{that you don’t come to the jazz concert}) \quad (\text{ausgerechnet}) \]

\[\Rightarrow \text{ Contradiction.} \]

(36) represents that the presuppositions of the imperative (i) and the particle \textit{ausgerechnet} (ii) cannot be satisfied simultaneously because they result in a contradiction in the domain of preference relations: the imperative presupposes that the speakers prefers \(p\) to come about (i), while the meaning contribution of \textit{ausgerechnet} in (36) is exactly the opposite, namely that \(p\) is dispreferred over some other proposition by the speaker (ii).

To summarize this finding in terms of the modal analysis of imperatives by Kaufmann (2012), we could also say that, given a modal base \((f)\) and an ordering source \((g)\), we have seen above that \textit{ausgerechnet} cannot be embedded under imperatives because the different ordering sources \(g_1\) and \(g_2\) result in a contradiction (see (36b)): 

The analysis in (36) and the illustration in (37) now also make clear why cases such as (29), repeated here for convenience, are totally fine:

(Klar,) nimm ausgerechnet einen feuchten Lappen! So verschmierst Du of course use PART a damp cloth this way smear you dann den Dreck! Ganz toll! then the dirt totally great ‘(Ironic:) Of course, use a damp cloth (of all things)! This way, you’ll smear the dirt around! Well done!

In those cases, the speaker uses the imperative as a commanding of actions the speaker does not want the hearer to realize. Kaufmann (2012: 69-70; 153-154) uses the notion of insincerity for such examples and clarifies that in such uses, the speaker already knows that the hearer will do the exact opposite of what he is told to do and that the OSR introduced above is violated. Accordingly, in these cases no contradiction arises because the speaker preferences (or ordering sources $g$, see above) conveyed by both the ironic use of the imperative (i) and by the particle ausgerechnet (ii) are in accordance with each other:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. (Klar,) nimm ausgerechnet einen feuchten Lappen!} & \quad \text{(of course) use PART a damp cloth} \\
\text{b. } [Xa]^{K_z}(w) \text{ is defined only if} & \\
\text{ (i) } \forall w' \in cs(c): \text{SIM}(w', cs(c) \cap \text{that you use a damp cloth}) \prec_{sp(c),w} \text{SIM}(w', cs(c) \cap \text{that you don’t use a damp cloth}) \quad \text{(ironic use of IMP)} \\
\text{ (ii) } \forall w' \in cs(c): \text{SIM}(w', cs(c) \cap \text{that you use a damp cloth}) \prec_{sp(c),w} \text{SIM}(w', cs(c) \cap \text{that you don’t use a damp cloth}) \quad \text{(ausgerechnet)}
\end{align*}
\]

Note that these cases of improperly used imperatives do not correspond to the class of disinterested advices analyzed by Condoravdi and Lauer (2012: 39-40). In their examples, the speaker does not have any interest in the hearer realizing the content of the imperative. However, realization of the content does not go against the preferences of the speaker in their cases, which is the case in examples like (38).
The last data point from Section 3.1 above – *ausgerechnet* in negated imperatives – can also be explained under the account presented here:

(40) Nimm nicht *ausgerechnet* den schwarzen Pulli mit!
    take not *PART* the black pullover with
    ‘Of all things, don’t take the black pullover with you!’

In cases like (40), the speaker uses the imperative as a command to not carry out the dispreferred action \( p \). That is, the ordering sources \( g \) for \([\text{ausgerechnet}](p)\) and \([\text{IMP}]\) do not contradict each other because both \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are such that \( \forall w' \in \text{cs}(c): \text{SIM}(w', \text{cs}(c) \land \text{that you take the black pullover with you}) <_{\text{sp}(c),w} \text{SIM}(w', \text{cs}(c) \land \text{that you don’t take the black pullover with you})\).

Having accounted for the incompatibility of *ausgerechnet* in imperative speech acts by referring to another felicity condition of this particular speech act (the OSR), we can now turn to the general picture and ask what the discussion of the scalar focus particles *even* and *ausgerechnet* can tell us about the relation between illocutionary force and focus particle in general.

### 4 Conclusion: The thin line between focus and discourse particles

In this paper, we have seen that the presuppositions of imperatives and some scalar focus particles cannot be satisfied simultaneously in some cases. In particular, a speaker can only perform the imperative speech act felicitously with these particles if either extra felicity conditions are added to the epistemic felicity condition EUC (*even*, see Section 2), or if the semantics of the focus particle is not in conflict with the constraint on imperative speech acts imposed by the OSR (*ausgerechnet*, see Section 3).

The main contribution of the present paper is to show, for the first time, how the incompatibility of certain scalar focus particles can be explained by referring to meaning components that are part of modeling the illocutionary force of an utterance (in our cases: imperative speech acts). In particular, it has been claimed that the restrictions discussed in this paper only hold for imperative speech acts, and thus the paper has explored to what extent this might have to do with the constraints that are imposed on this particular speech act type. A big issue in the background of the present article is of course the well-known fact that the use of many focus-sensitive particles is odd without an appropriate precontext. This has already been mentioned here and there in the paper (e.g., FN 3, 17, and at some other points). Consider prominent examples like the following (Kripke 2009: 373):

(41) SAM is having dinner in New York tonight, too.

Kripke (2009) has pointed out that *too* has an anaphoric requirement that when one uses the particle *too*, one refers to information that is present in what Kripke calls the ‘active context’ (see also Ruys 2015 for recent discussion). The type of presuppositional anaphora associated with additive elements like *too* cannot be used when no context is salient in which another person than Sam is having dinner in New York. Crucially, as Kripke (2009) argues, one can assume that many people are having dinner in New York on any given night, and a sentence like (41) should be appropriate when its presuppositions are fulfilled. However, *too* cannot be used without a special precontext.
because if (41) is uttered out of the blue, a hearer will ask about a specific person or persons other than Sam that the speaker has in mind. Accordingly, the felicity of using *too* cannot come merely from the ‘passive context’, that is, from the fact that it is general conversational background between speaker and hearer that many people are having dinner in New York on any given night.

All in all, both additive focus particles like *too* and scalar ones like *even* and *ausgerechnet* place specific requirements on the discourse (answering the ‘Current Question’ of the discourse; see Beaver and Clark 2008 for a comprehensive account). However, the point of this paper has been to demonstrate that, in addition to these well-investigated constraints, there are also differences regarding to what extent focus particles can be accommodated in different speech acts.

I hope to have succeeded in showing that the occurrence of at least two focus particles (English ‘unlikelihood’ *even* and German *ausgerechnet*) is also restricted at the level of illocutionary force: for their exact licensing conditions, it is indeed important in what kind of speech act they occur in, resulting in specific extra requirements (e.g., added precontext or reversal of preference relations as part of the felicity conditions of the imperative speech act). This kind of dependence on the respective speech act is known to exist for discourse particles in languages like German, but (so far) not for focus particles.

Work like the present one in fact suggests that it is difficult to support the idea that there is a fundamental difference between use-conditional and presuppositional content in the context of comparing discourse and focus particles. Gutzmann (2013: 11-12) makes a case for the use-conditional status of discourse particles by giving examples like the following. These cases show that discourse particles, although if used in the right sentence type, are not appropriate in any discourse context. For instance, using *wohl* (= as I assume) in a context like in (42) renders sentence (42a) infelicitous. In the same context, the utterance becomes felicitous if the discourse particle is left out, as shown in (42b):

(42) [Context: A happy father rushes out of the delivery room]
   a. # Es ist *wohl* ein Mädchen!
      ‘It’s a girl!’
   b. Es ist ein Mädchen!
      ‘It’s a girl!’

However, as pointed out by Grosz (to appear), additive particles like *too* with their discourse-anaphoric presuppositions behave similarly in this respect; observe their infelicity in the same context:

(43) [Context: A happy father rushes out of the delivery room]
    # It’s a girl, too!

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19 Gutzmann (2013) uses *ja* instead of *wohl* in this example. I use *wohl* because I think Gutzmann may have overlooked that *ja* is ambiguous between an ‘as you and I know’ reading (which is indeed infelicitous in a context like (42)) and a mirative reading (*Du hast ja’n Loch im Ärmel!* ‘You have a hole in your sleeve’; see Kratzer & Matthewson 2009). The mirative reading would be totally fine in a context like (42).
Crucially, both (42a) and (43) can be true statements in spite of their pragmatic infelicity. If discourse particles are use-conditional, as suggested by Gutzmann (2013, 2015), this lends support to the idea that focus particles like too and even contribute use-conditional content too (or are elements triggering conventional implicatures as sketched by Potts 2015). Crucially, the data in the present paper also show that focus particles do not only contribute use-conditional content, but, in some case, display illocutionary restrictions that can be spelled out by looking at the felicity conditions of the respective speech act operator – in our case: the imperative. As we have sketched at the outset of this paper, such restrictions are well known from the empirical domain of discourse particles.

As for research on particles, it is also interesting to note that in languages like German, focus and discourse particles are closely related categories. Discourse particles are also focus-sensitive and often double as focus particles (e.g., Grosz 2016), and their signature property is that their use is constrained at the level of illocutionary force. In addition, discourse particles, when they are stacked, exhibit ordering restrictions (e.g., Thurair 1989), which is also the case for focus particles (Peter even also only drank water vs. *Peter only also even drank water; see Zimmermann 2011).

This paper has shed new light on the closeness of the relationship between these two categories. Specifically, the data above demonstrate that it is worth exploring to what extent discourse-anaphoric requirements of focus particles like even and ausgerechnet restrict the particular use of speech acts – a pattern we also observe in the domain of discourse particles, which also restrict the use of an utterance at the illocutionary level on the basis of their discourse-anaphoric semantics. Accordingly, focus and discourse particles appear even more closely related than previously thought.

References


