
Great Expectations: An Intensive Self Analysis

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GREAT EXPECTATIONS: AN INTENSIVE SELF ANALYSIS

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the syntax, semantics and, peripherally, the morphology of the construction known as the emphatic or intensive "reflexive". From the outset let us state that our intention will not be to offer a finished or formally exacting proposal but rather to collect and order data that demand an explication in any such theory. Thus our survey and our sketch of a formal treatment should not be understood to claim that everything we mention more or less informally has been explained or accounted for.

According to a definition by Bolinger (1972:17), an intensifier is "any device that scales a quality, whether up or down or somewhere between the two", and degree expressions are words or phrases expressing a quality that can be so scaled. Obviously, intensive reflexives are only one kind of construction fitting this general characterization that does not yet distinguish between different kinds of pertinent qualities and different ways of scaling them. We, nevertheless, refrain from giving in advance a more specific definition, stating the necessary and sufficient properties of the particular intensifier construction that we are interested in, and proceed inductively instead.

In a non-trivial sense, the phenomenon under discussion here is so widespread as to be universal. Not only the semantic concept of intensive reflexivization but also the combination of grammatical features utilized in expressing this type of intensification appears to be highly invariant across a large sample of languages, some 60 of which have been investigated by Moravcsik (1972). Our task will be to seek to come to the bottom of intensive reflexives by means of a close examination of only one language, English. On occasion, we will, nevertheless, make use of a contrastive approach, in the hope that a comparison of German and English, wherever there are significant differences, will allow us to comb at least some language-specific idiosyncracies from the more general features of this construction.

One factor that deserves particular mention before proceeding concerns the form of intensifier elements. Some languages like English have intensifiers morphologically agreeing, in person, number and gender,

with a clausemate NP, whereas other languages like German have uninflecting intensifiers, a property which admits ambiguities not found in English (cf. (2a) below). The following specimens of the intensifier construction illustrate the differences between the two languages.

- (1a) *Lizzy Borden shaved father himself.*
- (b) *Lizzy Borden shaved father herself.*
- (c) *Lizzy Borden herself shaved father.*
- (2a) *Lizzy Borden barbierte den Vater selbst.* (= 1a or 1b)
- (b) *Lizzy Borden selbst barbierte den Vater.* (= 1c)

On the basis of their inflectional paradigms, intensifiers in English, but not in German, appear to coincide with ordinary reflexive pronouns. This paradigmatic (but clearly not necessarily distributional) identity raises several questions. Is the relationship between reflexivization and intensification merely a case of accidental homophony? And, if not, what is the common denominator? The argument that reflexivization and intensification are in some way decidedly different would seem to find strong support from German, where inflecting reflexive pronouns do not resemble at all the uninflecting intensifier *selbst*. Under the assumption that intensification works similarly in German and English, at least from the semantic-pragmatic viewpoint, German moreover provides some sort of a safeguard against confusing instances of reflexivization and emphasis. It furthermore casts some doubt upon the overall appropriateness of the term “emphatic reflexive”.

2. TYPES OF INTENSIFIER: A SHORT SURVEY OF PREVIOUS TREATMENTS

The above examples already indicate that both German and English permit their respective intensifiers to occur in several positions in the sentence. Moravcsik (1972) in her crosslinguistic survey distinguishes accordingly two types of intensifiers: “head-bound”, i.e. those that are placed immediately after the NP they act upon, and “sentence-final”. But, at least the name of the latter variety is not entirely felicitous, for a number of reasons. Firstly, in subordinate clauses in German the finite verb is usually sentence-final, and intensifiers certainly cannot be extraposed to the right of the finite verb:

- (3a) *Because the Prime Minister insulted the Queen himself, . . .*
- (b) *Weil der Premierminister die Königin* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{selbst beleidigte} \\ \textit{*beleidigte selbst} \end{array} \right.$. . .

Secondly, in German main clauses with periphrastic verb complexes the intensifier is not as absolutely sentence-final as in English:

- (4a) *The Prime Minister has insulted the Queen himself.*
 (b) *Der Premierminister hat die Königin* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{selbst beleidigt} \\ \text{*beleidigt selbst} \end{array} \right.$

And thirdly, although as a rule the surface position of the intensifier in English coincides with Moravcsik's dichotomy, whereas German provides an additional slot between verb and object for placing the intensifier (contrast (5a) and (5b)), there are notable exceptions even in English, since there exist instances that are, on the face of it, neither head-bound nor sentence-final (cf. (6)).

- (5a) *The Prime Minister (himself) insulted (*himself) the Queen (himself).*
 (b) *Der Premierminister (selbst) beleidigte (selbst) die Königin (selbst).*
 (6) *How can I give advice when I (myself) am (**myself**) affected (myself)?*

Notice, furthermore, that for purposes of topicalization apparent intensifiers may also be brought into sentence-initial position, in English as well as in German, which does not at all seem to fit into the picture of Moravcsik's classification:¹

- (7a) *Himself he favors a more step-by-step approach to the theory of understanding.*
 (b) *Selbst favorisiert er mehr eine schrittweise Annäherung an die Theorie des Verstehens.*

It seems that *pace* Moravcsik and Ross (1974:67), who proposes the "simple syntactic law" that "emphatic reflexive pronouns follow the noun phrases . . . they modify", the placement of intensifiers has to be regulated by more liberal rules. It is another question whether or not movement rules as advocated by Ross and other transformationalists (see below) are appropriate here.

Although at this stage of inquiry we cannot rely on any obvious method of classifying the various sequential occurrences of intensifiers, it seems intuitively justifiable to distinguish (at least) two broad types and to associate one of them with Moravcsik's head-bound type (hereafter marked by a subscript 1: *himself*₁, *selbst*₁) and to characterize the other as non-head-bound (subscript 2: *himself*₂, *selbst*₂). What remains to be done is to explicate the basis of these intuitions pointing towards two different

intensifier types; surface linear order alone surely is no unambiguous indicator of a distinction along the lines of Moravcsik's original proposal.

We also note in passing another formally intensifier-like element in German and certain other languages, which is usually found before the affected NP (or other phrase type), but clearly differs from (7), and corresponds to English *even*:

- (8a) *selbst der König – der König selbst*
- (b) *même le roi – le roi lui-même* (French)
- (c) *själva/själve/självaste kungen – kungen själv* (Swedish)
- (d) *even the king – the king himself*

In these cases, it is the main stress center rather than the location of the unstressed *even/selbst* that determines its scope (cf. Anderson 1972). This particular interaction of contrastive stress and linear order contrasts with all previous examples with the main stress on the intensifier itself.

- (9a) *selbst der König* (b) *der König selbst*

The intensifier with the meaning 'even' will not be our primary concern in the present paper; yet in connection with (9b) it is worth noticing that contrastive sentence intonation is characteristic of intensifier constructions (cf. (10)),²

- (10) *Hamlet himself burped.* **Hamlet himself burped.*

which suggests that such notions as emphasis and contrast play a crucial role in the semantic-pragmatic analysis of these constructions.

The recent literature on intensive "reflexives" includes Cantrall (1973; 1974), Moravcsik (1972), Moyne (1971), Moyne & Carden (1974), Leys (1973) and Dirven (1973).³ A brief sketch of the essentials of these analyses ought to suffice for our present purpose. The main issues, especially for transformational treatments, are:

- (A) Are reflexive pronouns and emphatic elements transformationally related, directly or indirectly?
- (B) Are all or any occurrences of the *himself*-intensifier transformationally related?

Cantrall (1973; 1974) opts for the position that reflexives, emphatic reflexives (what Moravcsik (1972:271) calls "headless intensifiers"), intensive pronouns and emphatic *own* are transformationally related by some arcane rules of free deletion.

- (11a) *John shaved Albert before he shaved himSELF.* [Emphatic reflexive]
- (b) *Jim spoiled the broth himself, the cooks being absent.* [Intensive]
- (c) *Jim himself spoiled the broth, the cooks being absent.* [Intensive]
- (d) *Jim spoiled his own broth.* [Emphatic own]

His claim is that intensification is ultimately reducible to reflexivization (1974:80); a syntactic deep structure like (12) allegedly is subject to an ordinary reflexivization transformation and is, finally, converted into sentences like (11), or even (13), with deleted intensifier and stress on the preceding NP.

- (12) *Jim – Jim's own self – was the one who spoiled the broth.*
- (13) *JIM spoiled the broth, the cooks being absent.*

Sentence-final intensives result from rightward movement; they are thus viewed as a kind of "floating appositive" (1973:57). This analysis thus claims that (11b), (11c) and (13) are all equivalent, which appears counterintuitive at least as far as (13) is concerned. As to the function of intensives, Cantrall observes that all of them indiscriminately are used rhetorically to point up "remarkability" (1973:64) or to "give contrastive emphasis to another NP in the sentence" (1974:19).

The principle issue that Moyne (1971) is out to solve is likewise whether reflexives and intensives are related. His conclusion is that they are, but not directly. Both are created by a clause-internal pronominalization rule, but they differ from each other in so far as the intensifier construction demands a prior rule of emphatic reduplication of subject and perhaps also object NP's (cf. also Moyne & Carden 1974). The duplicate then pronominalizes obligatorily. (11c) is hence derived via

- (14) *Jim, he spoiled the broth.*

At this stage, an optional emphatic element, in English *-self*, can normally be added to an emphasized NP. *Himself* may then be moved transformationally to other positions in the sentence. Moyne & Carden (1974) informally characterize the meaning, or force, of *himself* as emphasis; they however admit (1974:240) that "in English, the surface position of *himself* affects the meaning . . .". *Himself*₂ has an interpretation like "voluntarily" or "personally", while *himself*₁ is merely emphatic.

Moravcsik (1972) reflects that on semantic and syntactic grounds intensifiers might be, or come from, (a) reduplication, (b) dislocation (i.e. *Jim, he . . .*), (c) a quantifier, (d) apposition, or (e) an adverb. She tentatively concludes (1972:276) that "there is some reason, however, for

considering all intensifiers to be adverbial", but sees a difficulty in ascribing a verb-modifying role to a constituent that agrees with the subject. In support of the adverbial hypothesis is the fact that some adverbs, especially local adverbs, indeed evidence a distribution like intensifiers. However, some quantifier-like expressions, e.g. *both*, *even*, *each*, *only*, show a similar distribution, or – as some have said – can float to similar positions. Moravcsik also points out that the position of the intensifier influences the interpretations of such sentences as (15).

- (15a) *Jones repaired his car himself but the chairman of the hospital board didn't.* (I.e. someone else repaired the chairman's car.)
- (b) *Jones himself repaired his car but the chairman of the hospital board didn't.* (I.e. the chairman's car is still unrepaired.)

Notwithstanding the fact that no sufficiently explicit and comprehensive accounts of the meaning of intensifiers are available – in contradistinction to such elements as *only* and *even*, which apparently are more amenable to a logical analysis – it is pretty obvious that all suggestions of transformational intensifier movement are cast in an unfavorable light by data such as (15), if those making such claims would simultaneously contend that transformations preserve meaning. Sentences with two occurrences of intensive reflexives, a head-bound and a sentence-final, provide another, and even more decisive, argument against movement analyses.

- (16a) *The President himself repairs his car himself.*
- (b) **The President himself himself repairs his car.*

On the commonly entertained assumption that floating sentence-final intensives are launched from a head-bound position, (16a) has to be derived from a source like (16b), but double head-bound intensification is surely impossible.

At least implicitly, Dirven (1973) presents a number of arguments against any such transformational movement analyses, and also against identifications of intensification and reflexivization. What is especially important for us is that he distinguishes two types of intensifiers approximately along the lines of the head-bound/sentence-final dichotomy, viz. discourse emphaizers (*himself*₁) and predicate emphaizers (*himself*₂), and that he in principle recognizes the semantic and pragmatic basis of this distinction. In Dirven (1973) no attempt is made, however, to go beyond the level of more or less impressionistic observation, which at times makes it difficult to evaluate his proposals. Dirven (1973:290), for example, claims that a "relatively wide variety of interpretations... can be found with [the predicate] emphaizer", but he is not able to clearly delineate

under which conditions which interpretations of this intensifier are possible. Below we shall demonstrate that even more distinctions have to be made, and that there in fact are (at least) two types of predicate intensifiers, and that their contribution to the meaning of sentences is by no means context-independent, as Dirven erroneously claims for all predicate emphaizers.

We now propose to approach the most fundamental question (C),

- (C) Exactly what semantic-pragmatic effects on sentences do intensifiers have?

by first distinguishing more carefully the different types of intensifiers and by contrasting more clearly their respective contributions to the interpretations of the containing sentences.

3. SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF *himself*₁, *himself*₂, AND *himself*₃

Previously we have mentioned surface position as one criterion that sometimes overtly severs *himself*₁ from *himself*₂. There are, however, quite a number of other features that serve to separate and identify more reliably (at least) two distinct types of intensification. By collecting these distinctive features we hope to undermine proposals of a unified analysis of intensifiers that incorporate transformational movement.

The head-bound intensifier appears somewhat more transparent and thus we begin with it. We find Cantrall's idea of "remarkability" quite appropriate for describing one component of the meaning of *himself*₁.

- (17) *Caesar himself!*

The utterance of 17 can be perfectly appropriate in situations not too difficult to imagine. Brutus, for example, could have made this exclamation in front of the Senate on the Ides of March. Viewed from the perspective of the hearer or from the perspective of a less directly involved analyst of utterance samples, the presence of an intensifier allows one to make certain inferences about the speaker, about the person or thing mentioned and about the situation of the utterance. Three factors figure crucially in the judgment of the appropriateness of such utterances as (17): It must be the case that (a) this person or thing mentioned, (b) in this particular situation, is remarkable (c) in the eyes of the speaker. By itself, nothing need be remarkable about Caesar showing up in front of the Senate on the Ides of March; nevertheless, (17) is an appropriate utterance for a group of tourists from Gaul who do not usually encounter VIP's like Caesar in their

everyday activities. Whereas here, remarkability has come into play via the utterer's perspective, it has to be due to the remarkability of the situation itself (which may, however, not be obvious to every participant) that (17) can appropriately be uttered by Brutus as well, a close friend of Caesar's, who after all sees his emperor every day in these surroundings. On the other hand, the servants who bring Gaius Julius his breakfast can hardly be expected to make such a remark, there being nothing unusual at all about either utterer, addressee, or situation. Or, to take another example, let us contrast (18a) and (b).

- (18a) *The editor himself makes the final decision.*
 (b) *The editor makes the final decision.*

Under the assumption that editors as a rule make the decisions and that speaker and hearer know this, then 18a is not an appropriate statement. But should a speaker utter 18a, his interlocutors, we contend, must conclude that he does not know about the standard practice among editors.

The notions of remarkability and expectancy can also become relevant at a metalinguistic level; *himself*₁ can serve the important function of re-focusing upon a previously introduced NP that has lost its topical status or that has not yet been topic. Consider (19):

- (19) *John is the real odd ball in the family. John's/his brother is respectably married and has five children. — is a childless bachelor who doesn't even own a house.*

Expectancy seems to be crucially involved in the following way. Here the first topic, *John*, does not remain topic throughout, but even if the discourse should begin with the second sentence, the genitive construction, *John's brother*, inherently establishes a hierarchy that takes John as a point of reference, and makes the reference of the discourse topic contingent upon the genitive. With respect to this linguistic context, the expectancy is, then, that the current topic continues to be a topic. Hence if the pronoun *he* fills the gap in (19), it must refer to John's brother, despite the ensuing contradiction. It is the marked and unexpected case of topic change that is signalled by filling the gap with *he himself*. If *himself*₁ is omitted, the same effect results from contrastive stress on the simple pronoun, or from *but*.

Notice, furthermore, that the person or group referred to by an intensified NP must be capable of being identified in the first place. The use of the juridical form of address or registration for (as yet) nameless persons accompanied by *himself*₁ is strikingly inappropriate for any non-farfetched

situation:

- (20a) **Joe Doaks himself!*
 (b) **John and Mary Doe themselves!*

Intuitively, the notion of remarkability implies contrast; in order for something to be remarkable there must exist a background of commonplace or non-remarkable actions or events. When *himself*₁ is employed we find that remarkability ranking often involves assumptions of cultural and social stratification shared by speaker and addressees; cf. the different degrees of appropriateness in (21).

- (21a) *The king himself worked in the fields.*
 (b) **The serfs themselves worked in the fields.*

To link these preliminary semantic characterizations with syntactic facts, the role of identifiability also comes to bear in the case of indefinite or quantified NP's. Moravcsik (1972) among others has observed that *himself*₁ unlike *himself*₂ cannot co-occur with indefinite articles nor with quantifiers.

- (22) **A pyromaniac himself set fire to the woods.*
 (23)

All	}	cooks (* <i>themselves</i>) spoil the broth (<i>themselves</i>).
Several		
Many		
Some		

Actually this generalization as it stands is misleading since indefinite NP's with a specific reference permit *himself*₁, as dialogue (24) shows.

- (24) A: *All Cretans lie.*
 B: *Where did you hear that?*
 A:

<i>A Cretan himself</i>	}	<i>told me.</i>
<i>Cretans themselves</i>		
<i>Some Cretans themselves</i>		

When a referring (specific) indefinite NP is subject, some languages (such as French; cf. Anscombe 1973:67–8) demand a different tense than that used for generic and non-specific indefinites:

- (25a) **Un président lui-même n'y a pas droit.* (présent)
 'A President himself doesn't have the right.'
 (b) *Un président lui-même n'y a pas eu droit.* (passé composé)

There may also be correlations between specificity of subject and tense and aspect in English and German. The specific interpretation of indefinites is

compatible with the German perfect or with the English present perfect but not with the simple past in either language. Compare (22) and (26):

- (26a) *A pyromaniac himself has set fire to the woods.*
- (b) *Ein Pyromane selbst hat den Wald angezündet.*

It is certainly no coincidence that definite but non-referring NP's, i.e. attributive ones in Donnellan's (1966) sense, generally do not accept a head-bound intensifier:

- (27a) **Smith's murderer himself (whoever he is) is insane.*
- (b) **We don't know yet who is going to win this year's derby, but the victor himself is expected to cross the finish line at 4:30.*
- (c) **We wanted to call the doctor himself, but we didn't know any.*

Intuitions are somewhat less clearcut with generics. We only notice in passing that the acceptability of intensified generic NP's seems to be affected by some elusive characteristics of the predicate, and that in general the non-head-bound variety of intensification yields even worse results.

- (28a) *Unicorns (*themselves) exist (*themselves).*
- (b) *The dodo (?itself) is extinct (*itself).*
- (c) *Man (himself) is (himself) a product of his environment (?himself).*

From the assumption that *himself*₁ intensification presupposes specific reference one can account for a number of additional previously unconnected facts. *Himself*₁ does not co-occur with absolute reflexives, which we do not regard as referring NP's (cf. Edmondson 1976):

- (29a) **Albert behaved himself himself₁.*
- (b) **Albert benahm sich selbst₁.*

nor with interrogative pronouns:

- (30) **Who himself spoiled the broth?*

nor with non-specific indefinite pronouns:

- (31) **Someone himself spoiled the broth.*

Although we are uncertain of the referential status of vocative expressions, we note that they also resist intensification with head-bound *himself*₁:

- (32) **Play it again, Sam { himself / yourself }*

Although relative pronouns are formally identical with interrogative pronouns in English, they should be regarded as definite and referring expressions, which ought to entail their being compatible with head-bound intensifiers. As a matter of fact, a subject relative like *who* allows intensification, whereas *who* as object apparently is a bit more repellent:⁴

- (33a) *They re-elected the President who himself had met my uncle Toby a couple of years ago.*
 (b) ?... *who himself my uncle Toby had met...*

Interestingly, if a relative clause is introduced by *that*, this type of intensification is categorically excluded:

- (34) **They re-elected the President that himself...*

This ties in very well with one particular position in the still lively controversy about the relative *that*. Some have denied it the status of a genuine relative pronoun and instead identify it with the general subordinating complementizer *that* – a stance that was already taken by Kruisinga and Jespersen (cf. Jespersen 1961, III:153–68). Jespersen's (1961, VII:170–3) failure to distinguish between the essentially different types of intensification that are suggested in this paper then leads him to wonder why (35) is not as ungrammatical as (34).

- (35) *This is the man that had written the article himself.*

Since Jespersen's position here closely resembles transformational intensifier movement analyses, it is only right that he be puzzled by this fact. But, obviously, in (35) we have a case of *himself*₂, which, as is being demonstrated, does not at all require a referring, definite head phrase in the first place.

The interpretation on non-head-bound intensifiers is not necessarily bound up with remarkability nor does it require NP's with specific reference. Such sentences as (36) and (37) speak for an interpretation of *himself*₂ that emphasizes self-action rather than action carried out by delegates.

- (36) *The question is whether the President erased the tapes himself.*
 (37) *I'd rather play it myself, Sam!*

Although it is primarily actions that can be delegated, occasionally it also makes sense to emphasize that certain individuals are in certain states or possess certain properties, without being agents or immediate experiencers. What *herself* appears to be doing in sentences like (38) is to highlight the notion of self-involvement and, in this particular case, to

point out that a certain knowledge derives from immediate experience rather than from second-hand information – which is implied to be the more usual state of affairs.

- (38a) (*My grandmother knows these things.*)
 She is (herself) a witch (herself).
 (b) *Sie ist (selbst) eine Hexe (*selbst).*

Since *herself*₁ can occur independently of the agentive nature of its head, one might be inclined to take the *herself*'s in (38) for a variety of the head-bound intensifier, derived by rightward movement of *herself/selbst* from (39).

- (39a) *She herself is a witch.*
 (b) *Sie selbst ist eine Hexe.*

However, the meaning of (39), intuitively, does not quite coincide with that of (38); and notice, furthermore, that head-bound-intensifiers would be prohibited in cases like (40), for the reasons that were mentioned in connection with (22) and (23) above.

- (40) *All/some elderly ladies (*themselves) are witches (themselves).*

Moravcsik (1972) quite rightly characterizes the non-head-bound usage of intensifiers as adverbial, and since the sense of such modification is most closely related to adverbs of manner like 'in person' or 'personally', sentences that do not express an action that could also be delegated if the agent so wished, do not usually occur with non-head-bound intensifiers. This tendency is illustrated by the following examples of passives, statives and the like.

- (41) **The Pope died himself.*
 (42) **Fritz grew himself.*
 (43) **John was taller than Mary himself.*
 (44) **Jones struck the windshield himself.⁵*
 (45) **Oskar duzte einige Kollegen selbst.*
 'Oskar said thou to some colleagues himself.'⁶
 (46) **Scarlett was blown by the wind herself.*

Despite the fact that most of these sentences are glaringly unacceptable as they stand, in certain contexts they too can become possible:

- (47) *How could the Pope speak of immortality when he knew he would die himself!*

The question is how and why does the context in (47) render an unacceptable sentence acceptable under the *himself*₂ reading? At first sight, it does not seem to make sense to speak of more or less direct involvement; one dies or one doesn't. Yet, just as one can become acquainted with witchcraft without being one, there is also a certain body of experience or common knowledge associated with death, and this can be acquired with varying degrees of directness. The most direct involvement is, of course, experiencing the act of dying. The kind of context provided in (47) points up the possibility of a gradient experience, the prerequisite for using *himself*₂. One can construct analogous contexts for (41)–(46) with varying degrees of plausibility, on the following pattern:

- (48a) *John knows what it means to be taller than Mary, for he is taller than Mary himself.*
- (b) *Scarlett knows what it means to be blown by the wind, for she was once blown by the wind herself.*

As this last example indicates, acceptable passives with non-head-bound intensifiers also occur, although it has to be noticed that they have no obvious active counterparts with non-head-bound intensification:

- (49a) *These cops have themselves once been arrested by the Sheriff.*
- (b) **The Sheriff has themselves once arrested these cops.*

It seems that adverbial intensifiers are directly applied to the verb phrase that has already been passivized.

The sentence (49a) calls to mind the cases mentioned in (5) and (6), which we have to this point left out of consideration. Intensifiers in post-auxiliary position seem to have different interpretations from either *himself*₁ or *himself*₂; at least such sentences as (49a) do not fit very well into the pattern (48) (compare the acceptability of (50a/b)),

- (50) *These cops know what it means to be arrested by a sheriff because*
- (a) *they've been arrested by a sheriff themselves.*
- (b) **they've themselves been arrested by a sheriff.*

nor do they pattern like *himself*₁:

- (51a) *No one has himself ever been arrested by a sheriff.*
- (b) **No one himself has ever been arrested by a sheriff.*

Thus we see no other choice than to assume the existence of a third intensifier construction, which we might call *himself*₃. We take this step with some trepidation since we find it very difficult to isolate the distinctive features of this intensifier that would sever it from the interpretation of the

other two. On the one hand, something like remarkability seems to be involved, which aligns *himself*₃ with *himself*₁; on the other hand, it appears in the predicate, yet unlike *himself*₂ it does not affect the degree of directness of involvement of the subject. In fact, *himself*₃ can co-occur with practically any predicate irrespective of its lexical content. Notice also the different patterns of negation:

- (52a) *He did not erase the tapes himself.*
- (b) *He has himself not erased the tapes.*
- (c) *?He has not himself erased the tapes.*

We will come back to this point later but it is already clear that different inferences can be drawn from these, just as in the case of some other adverbs like *necessarily* or *on purpose*.

- (53a) *He didn't erase the tapes on purpose.* (Tapes are erased.)
- (b) *He has on purpose not erased the tapes.* (Tapes are not erased.)
- (c) *He has not on purpose erased the tapes.* (Uncertainty)

The principal if not exclusive use of *himself*₃, we feel, is to express a reversal of semantic roles. What is required of *himself*₃ sentences is that their subject has an opposite role in a similar predication that explicitly or implicitly precedes or commands it.

- (54a) *Lucrezia poisoned Lorenzo, and was herself poisoned by Cesare.* (agent → patient)
- (b) *Smith is taller than Jones, who is himself taller/shorter than my aunt.* (standard of comparison → person compared)
- (c) **Smith is taller than Jones and is himself shorter than my aunt.* (no switch of role)

This use can be approximately paraphrased by *in turn*.

There are a number of further intuitive semantic as well as distributional properties that *himself*₁, *himself*₂ and *himself*₃ clearly do not share. As has been observed by Moravcsik (1972), *himself*₁ unlike *himself*₂ forms a tightly bound unit with its head; hence the incapacity of grammatical operations such as deletions to act upon the head independently. This is true of identity deletions:

- (55a) *Superman demolished his TV and then (*himself₁) repaired it (himself₂).*
- (b) *The President promised his friends (*himself₁) to erase the tapes (himself₂).*⁷

and subjectless imperatives likewise do not admit head-bound intensifiers

superficially lacking a head:

- (56) (**Yourself*₁) *play it again* (*yourself*₂)!

In this respect, *himself*₃ resembles *himself*₂ (cf. 54a). But what about the sentence-initial variety of intensives in examples like 7 above? Here the intensifier alone, without its head, is fronted – which ought to be impossible if this were an instance of head-bound intensification. But the criteria relating to remarkability as well as definiteness and referentiality already provide sufficient evidence that sentence-initial intensives derive from *himself*₂ rather than *himself*₁. Whenever this kind of focusing is at all appropriate, there are no co-occurrence restrictions between, for instance, indefinite or quantified heads and fronted *himself*. Contrast (23) with the following example:

- (57) *Themselves* $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{some} \\ \text{many} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$ *cooks hardly ever spoil the broth.*

The tight bond between *himself*₁ and its head and the comparative independence of *himself*₂ also manifest themselves in the neat pattern that emerges from the following set of German data.

- (58a) *Der Präsident, und zwar* $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{er selbst} \\ \text{*selbst} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$, *löschte die Bänder.*
 ‘The President, in fact $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{he himself} \\ \text{*himself} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$, erased the tapes.’
- (b) *Der Präsident löschte, und zwar* $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{*er selbst} \\ \text{selbst} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$, *die Bänder.*
 ‘The President erased, in fact $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{*he himself} \\ \text{himself} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$, the tapes.’
- (c) *Und zwar* $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{*er selbst} \\ \text{selbst} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$ *löschte der Präsident die Bänder.*
 ‘In fact $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{*he himself} \\ \text{himself} \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$ the President erased the tapes.’

In the case of head-bound intensification, this *und zwar* construction requires a pronominal copy of the head to accompany the appositive intensifier, whereas appositive *selbst*₂, even in sentence-initial position, must be without such a copy.

So far we have been able to identify a number of environments where *himself*₁ could not occur. But there are also contexts that, on the contrary, do require its presence. We observe slight discrepancies between English and German; the assumption, however, is perhaps not too implausible that

the following English examples do not contain ordinary reflexives but result from deleting the head phrases of head-bound intensifiers. This occurs, perhaps, as the result of a kind of haplology and should not be viewed as a violation of the constraint just mentioned.

- (59a) *Nach seiner neunten Reinkarnation wurde Siddhartha wieder*
 { *Siddhartha
 { *er
 { er selbst
- (59b) *After his ninth reincarnation Siddhartha became*
 { *Siddhartha }
 { *he } again.
 { (him) himself }
- (60) *Josephine was* { innocence itself
 { *innocence
- (61a) *Gott überließ die Menschen* { *sich
 { sich selbst
- (b) *God delivered man unto* { *him
 { himself

There apparently are no contexts where *himself*₂ and *himself*₃ are either obligatory or obligatorily absent, which suggests that if *himself*₁ and *himself*_{2/3} share the common denominator of intensification or emphasis, then one of them has additional properties which cause its meaning potential in one case to be necessary and in the other an incompatible part of sentential meanings.

Finally, in German there are two morphological variants of the intensifier, *selbst* and *selber*. For most speakers the two are in free variation or are, with little motivation, regarded as stylistic or dialectal variants. We have found some speakers, however, who tend not to use *selber* in head-bound contexts. For these speakers there is, then, the possibility of resolving the *himself*₁/*himself*₂ ambiguity when the positions of the two coincide, as in (2a) above. Love's labor's lost, though, because most interlocutors would not appreciate that in (62) *selber* is used for the purpose of excluding a head-bound reading.

- (62) *Lizzy Borden barbierte den Vater selber.*

4. THE DISAMBIGUATING FUNCTIONS OF INTENSIFIERS

Of the semantic characteristics of the intensifier constructions one in particular deserves special attention since this feature provides the

functional basis for a common usage of the constructions. We refer to the disambiguating force of all types of intensifiers. From a consideration of what sorts of ambiguities are resolved, we might be able to draw some conclusions for an explicit semantics and pragmatics of *himself*₁, *himself*₂ and *himself*₃.

*Himself*₁ can clear up cases of referential ambiguity. German has two forms of the reciprocal pronoun, *sich* and *einander*, the former being homophonous with the reflexive. As (63) shows, the head-bound intensifier is not compatible with a reciprocal interpretation.

- (63a) *Hamlet and Polonius erdolchten* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{sich} \\ \textit{einander} \end{array} \right.$
 ‘H and P stabbed’ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{each other/themselves} \\ \text{each other} \end{array} \right.$
 (b) *Hamlet and Polonius erdolchten* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{sich selbst}_1 \\ \textit{*einander selbst}_1 \end{array} \right.$
 (only reflexive reading of *sich*)

Secondly, as the often cited multiply ambiguous example (64) shows, anaphoric relations are not always uniquely recoverable from surface structure.

- (64) *And Satan trembles when he sees the weakest saint upon his knees.*

Context or morphology in some languages permits one to avoid such problems. Head-bound intensifiers in German and English serve an analogous purpose.

- (65a) *Hamlet noticed that he was bleeding.* (he = Hamlet or another)
 (65b) *Hamlet noticed that he himself was bleeding.* (he = Hamlet only)
 (66a) *Hamlet told Polonius that he was bleeding.* (he = Hamlet, Polonius, or a third)
 (b) *Hamlet told Polonius that he himself was bleeding.* (he = Hamlet)
 (67a) *Hamlet_i sah Polonius_j die Pistole auf* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{ihn}_{ik} \\ \textit{sich}_{ij} \end{array} \right.$ *richten.*
 ‘H. saw P. aim with the gun at him(self)’
 (b) *Hamlet_i sah Polonius_j die Pistole auf* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{ihn}_i \\ \textit{sich}_j \end{array} \right.$ *selbst richten.*

When the choice of antecedent is between a sentence-internal NP and something outside the sentence, as in (65), then *himself*₁ eliminates the

latter coreference or demonstrative reference assignments. When the choice is between two sentence-internal NP's and something outside, as in (66), then as a rule unique coreference is established. Geach (1972:128–9) has suggested a possible explanation for this phenomenon, according to which *he himself* is “an *oratio obliqua* proxy for the first-person pronoun of *oratio recta*”.⁸ If we in addition wish to integrate the notion of remarkability into Geach's suggestion, then we note that what is remarkable is that the one who perceives and communicates is commenting upon his own state of being. Attractive though Geach's proposal might be, it would have to be generalized since (67) shows that the head-bound intensifier orients anaphoric pronouns toward underlying subjects, and, in particular, reflexives toward underlying clause-mate subjects. This is preferably the case for the active and passive variants in (68):

- (68a) *Hamlet_i stabbed Polonius_j as he_i himself came out of the palace.*
 (68b) *Polonius_j was stabbed by Hamlet_i as he_i himself came out of the palace.*

However, head-bound intensifiers do not have the capacity to distinguish cases of distributive/collective ambiguity as in 69.

- (69) *Die Komiteemitglieder kritisierten sich selbst und nicht die Regierung.*
 ‘The committee members criticized themselves (individually/as a group) and not the government’.

*Himself*₁ also does not influence subject/object ambiguities arising, for example, in reduced co-ordinate structures:

- (70) *Hamlet's uncle stabbed Hamlet's father, and not Hamlet himself.*

Head-bound intensifiers interact with identity sentences and their interpretations. In general, copulas may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, as the familiar examples (71a–b) illustrate.

- (71a) *The Morning Star is the Evening Star.*
 (b) *The Evening Star is the Morning Star.*
 (c) *The Morning Star* } *is Venus.*
 The Evening Star }

In (71a) and (71b) the symmetric relation ‘being the same planet’ holds between two manifestations of the planet, whereas in (71c) the term *the Morning Star* and *Venus* or *the Evening Star* and *Venus* do not have quite the same status. Every manifestation denoted by *the Morning Star* is also a

manifestation of *Venus* but not vice versa (cf. Dahl 1975:8). And only the more inclusive term can accept intensification in identity statements; that is, in (71c) only *Venus itself* and not *the Morning/Evening Star itself* is appropriate. When *itself*-intensification is added to either (71a) or (71b), then the symmetry of the predicate is skewed. Similarly the split personalities in R. L. Stevenson's novel have different ontological statuses.

(72a) *Mr Hyde (*himself₁) is Dr Jekyll (himself₁).*

(b) *Dr Jekyll (himself₁) is Mr Hyde (*himself₁).*

(72b) without intensifiers is, according to Dahl (1975:8), peculiar since Dr Jekyll is only Mr Hyde from time to time. But, even during his metamorphoses Dr Jekyll dominates with respect to bodily if not personal traits.⁹ Without intensification less inclusive terms have to precede the asymmetric copula, their status being indicated by word order. Yet, if the more inclusive term is marked with *himself₁*, either word order is possible.

Himself₂ is also used to resolve ambiguous sentences. It confirms that the surface subject is the most immediate cause of some act, or the most direct experiencer of some event, expressed by the predicate.

(73a) *Albert came to the conclusion himself that $E = mc^2$.*

(b) *Ironside rolled over the edge himself.*

Sentences with *himself₂* entail their corresponding sentences without *himself₂*, but the converse may be false. This is particularly true for verbs that allow a mediated relation of causation or experience. In (73a) and (73b) without intensification Albert may have been told about *E* equalling mc^2 by other, more competent or inventive physicists, or Ironside may have been murdered.

There is a related form of *himself₂* that Moyne & Carden (1974:240) gloss as "voluntarily" or "intentionally". With *by*, *himself₂* can also mean "alone". Furthermore, it seems to prevent ambiguity.¹⁰

(74) *The Pope died by himself.* (i.e. he was all alone)

(75a) *Eggplants grow off/by themselves.* (alone/no external cause)

(b) *Eierfrüchte wachsen von selbst.* (no external cause)

(76) **Scarlett was blown by the wind by herself.*

In both languages the most conspicuous property of this usage of *himself₂* is the presence of an agentive preposition and the absence of an animateness requirement for the surface subject. *Himself₂* in such constructions emphasizes that external causation of an event or state is excluded. In passives, the *by*-phrase rather than the derived subject expresses the external cause for an event or state; and since the surface subject has no

agentive role in the first place, the basic requirement for the operation of *himself*₂ with its exclusive orientation toward the surface subject is not met. But in *get*-passives the surface subject has an agentive shade which, therefore, can be affected by *himself*₂:

- (77) *The Pope got killed by himself.*

Likewise in (78b) as opposed to (78a) agentiveness is compatible with Hamlet, even though Hamlet's role as agent is then denied.

- (78a) **Hamlet was taller than Polonius by himself.*
 (b) *Hamlet became taller than Polonius by himself.*

The role-reversing function of *himself*₃ also imbues it with the capacity to resolve some kinds of referential ambiguity. Consider (79).

- (79) *Hamlet has stabbed Polonius and he has (himself) stabbed his father's ghost.*

Without *himself*₃, *he* in absence of prosodic features can refer to either Hamlet or Polonius; with *himself*₃, however, only Polonius can be meant. If we compare (66b) with (80), then we find that the two intensifiers result in opposite interpretations of the anaphoric reference.

- (80) *Polonius told Hamlet that he was bleeding and Hamlet told Polonius that he was himself bleeding.* (last *he* = Polonius)

To account for the influence of *himself*₃ on the network of coreference, we need not assume that referring expressions in isolation are affected by this intensifier. The unique coreference assignment is an automatic consequence of the role-reversal.

5. *Self* IN WORD-FORMATION

A central question in the analysis of the role of *self* in word-formation concerns the predictability or constructibility of the meaning of complex words containing *self* from their constituent parts. It seems to us that there are several distinct aspects of predictability involved here that in previous analyses have not always been carefully kept apart.

Generative-transformational treatments have largely concentrated on establishing or disconfirming that the source of *self*-formations are underlying structures with coreferential terms upon which reflexivization, among other rules, is to apply. Chomsky's (1970:213-4) case for a lexicalist

position, which draws on a great number of *self*-compounds like *self-explaining*, *self-congratulatory*, *self-educated*, *self-fulfilling*, and *self-addressed*,¹¹ is intended to invalidate such transformational derivations of *self*-compounds, although words like *self-indulgent* or *self-indulgence* could seem to suggest that reflexivization might have occurred. Chapin's (1967:20–60, 166–77) more detailed analysis of English *self-ing* adjectives points toward a reflexive source in at least some cases. Firstly, there are occasionally paraphrastic relationships between such pairs as *Hamlet is deluding himself* and *Hamlet is self-deluding*. Secondly, there are no *self-ing* adjectives corresponding to intransitive verbs or transitive verbs that do not take reflexive objects (**a self-swimming actress* and **Hamlet is self-avoiding to a fault*). A general reflexive analysis, on the other hand, is confronted with overwhelming problems. The paraphrastic relationship does not always hold, and furthermore, not all reflexive constructions can be transformed into *self-ing* adjectives (**Hamlet is self-shooting/self-stabbing/self-killing/self-amusing/self-frightening*). This is true in particular of absolute reflexives and of 'middle' reflexives (**self-behaving*, **self-shaving*). Meys (1975:43–60) has shown that it is not the lexicalist-transformationalist controversy that is at stake here but the distinction between derived idiosyncrasy and item-particular idiosyncrasy. What Chomsky failed to prove was that the semantic idiosyncrasies are exclusive properties of *self*-compounds and not of their putative sources as well. As a matter of fact, a substantial number of participial and other *self*-compounds appear to have well-formed source sentences that allow reflexivization, although the strictly coreferential readings are incompatible with what such sentences really mean:

- (81a) *The problem explains itself.*
- (b) *The prophecy fulfilled itself.*

Meys (1975:48) further notes that the coreferential-reflexive analysis would amount to claiming that *self*-compounds are exceptions to Postal's (1969) "anaphoric island constraint", because a part of *self*-compounds is said to be coreferential with lexical material outside the compound word. Meys then goes on to propose another origin of *self*, viz. the emphatic reflexive, a possibility that Chapin (1967:44) was already hinting at. But which emphatic reflexive? Like other transformational grammarians, Meys and Chapin fail to distinguish between two different types of intensification and take it for granted that the head-bound variety plus some deletion and movement rules is all that is needed in order to relate sentences like (82a) to their meaningful underlying structures like (82b).

- (82a) *Hamlet was self-educated.*
 (b) *Hamlet was educated by Hamlet himself.*

Chapin (1967:166–77) also mentions that instead of paraphrases with straightforward reflexives his informant, in cases like *self-terminating*, *self-rewarding*, *self-answering*, *self-interpreting*, often preferred another, non-reflexive type of paraphrase with *by-himself*. As we have shown, *by-himself* constructions are a case of *himself*₂ intensification, but Chapin himself draws no such conclusions from his data.

Among other things such accounts still fail to explain why it is not the pronoun that shows up in complex words but invariably the intensive or emphatic element alone (**himself-educated*). This becomes particularly evident in German since here intensives differ in form from ordinary reflexives:

- (83) *Selbstkritik, Selbstmord, Selbstbildnis, Selbstfahrer,*
Selbstkosten, selbstgemacht, selbstklebend, but
**Sichbildnis, *Michselbstkritik, *sichselbstgenügsam.*

One wonders why on the basis of such comparative evidence it has apparently never been inferred that anaphoric islands are not at all penetrated in the case of *self*-compounds because intensification proper rather than reflexivization is the concept that is crucially relevant here. In Section 7 below, we try to argue that reflexivization and intensification are two different phenomena which are, however, closely linked together by their semantic-pragmatic values. In particular, *himself*₂ shares with true reflexives the meaning of ‘most directly involved participant in an action or state’, and this would account for the fact mentioned above that *self-ing* adjectives and other *self*-compounds can occasionally be paraphrased by reflexive constructions, without actually being derived from them by means of a syntactic rule of reflexivization.

We now turn to another type of unpredictability that to our knowledge has not been noticed before. *Self*-compounds do not make up one homogeneous class with respect to their interpretation but fall into two clearly distinct classes. They all have the initial element *self*, but this morpheme can quite diversely relate to intensifiers or, apparently, true reflexives. Though the sentences in (84) are entirely parallel, the corresponding *self*-compounds are not.

- (84a) *Ludwig defended the castle himself.*
 (b) *Ludwig financed the castle himself.*
 (c) *Ludwig defended himself.*
 (d) *Ludwig financed himself.*

- (85a) **Ludwig's self-financing.*
- (b) *Ludwig's self-financing of the castle.*
- (c) *Ludwigs selbstfinanziertes Schloß.*
- (c) *Ludwig's self-financed castle.*
- (86a) *Ludwig's self-defense.*
- (b) **Ludwig's self-defense of the castle.*
- (c) **Ludwigs selbstverteidigtes Schloß.*
- (c) **Ludwig's self-defended castle.*

There seems no systematic way of predicting whether a *self*-compound will be "transitive" (cf. (85)), i.e. will derive from a truly intensive source, or "intransitive" (cf. (86)), i.e. will derive from a reflexive. It might, furthermore, be worthwhile to consider whether the reflexive source too is not in reality an emphatic reflexive construction in disguise:

- (87a) *Ludwig defended himSELF.* (from: . . . *himself himself*)
- (b) *Ludwig verteidigte sich selbst.*

At any rate, one has to rely on lexical information to know that (85b) is relatable only to (84b) and not (84d), and that (86a) is relatable only to (84c) (or (87a)) and not to (84a). There can also be ambiguous cases as in *Selbststudium* 'self-study', which either means the study of oneself or the study by oneself without a teacher:

- (88a) *Ludwigs Selbststudium.* 'L's study of himself'
- (b) *Ludwigs Selbststudium der Werke Wagners.* 'L's study of Wagner's works without a guide or teacher'

Finally, let us note that the sense of *self* in *self*-compounds is never that of *himself*₁. This fact is naturally explained in our analysis which regards *himself*₁ as an operator on terms, and thus it is not surprising that an operator contained in compounds or nominalizations cannot 'modify' one of the surrounding terms. In the light of an analysis along such lines, the hypothesis of an anaphoric island constraint can essentially be maintained, for referentiality does not figure in our description of the value of *himself*₂.

6. A SKETCH OF THE VALUE OF *himself*₁

An explicit semantics of *himself*₁ demands, in our view, an account for the intuitive differences in two sentences differing only by the presence of the intensifier, cf. (89). We consider this demand, however, to be merely a minimal requirement. Ideally, such a theory would have to explicate and

predict when intensifiers can and cannot co-occur with various types of term phrases in the first place.

(89a) *Franco himself ordered the executions.*

(b). *Franco ordered the executions.*

The title of this paragraph contains the word 'value' because it is not entirely certain from the data considered above whether (89a) and (89b) really differ in their truth-values in a straightforward way or whether *himself*₁ depends on factors from the context of use that are normally regarded as pragmatic. The analysis that we shall suggest does not clearly separate the semantic and pragmatic values of this construction.

Natural language provides overwhelming evidence that the interpretation of (89a) is additively related to (89b) and that the something added is added to the NP-head. In tackling the contribution of *himself*₁ to the sentence, we shall also be assuming that two meaning components are impinging upon one another: (a) the **modal** contribution, which has been characterized with the notion 'remarkability'; and (b) the interaction of *himself*₁ and the **referential** properties of the modified NP. A further desideratum ought to be obvious from the previous discussion. The similarities between intensification and reflexivization in a huge number of languages are hardly an arbitrary co-incidence and an adequate theory should capture this fact naturally.

In analyzing (89a) we take our lead from Montague's PTQ (1974). Without working out every detail of the formalism, we believe that this approach is powerful enough to provide insightful and non-trivial explanations of intricate natural language phenomena. The syntax of English (or German) is represented, first of all, by means of a simple categorial language. To these structures are then applied a battery of translation rules that systematically map connex strings of elements in various categories onto a language of intensional logic. Thus, natural language expressions have counterparts or translation targets in the intensional language. These targets are then interpreted in terms of model theory. Since the translation rules and targets will be our major concern, only the immediately important features of the fragment of English (or German) syntax will be sketched.

The first observation to make is that *himself*₁ is attached to its head as is revealed by agreement (if there is agreement) and by co-constituency with the head. German provides particularly telling criteria for co-constituency. Only one syntactic constituent may precede the tense bearing element in declarative main clauses and yet *selbst*₁ with its sister NP may precede the finite verb. The next question to resolve is the categorial status of an

intensified phrase and of its constituent parts. The most plausible partial categorial representation for (89) is (90).

(90a) ((*Franco*_T (*himself*_{T/T})_T) (*ordered the executions*_{IV})_k)

(b) (*Franco*_T (*ordered the executions*_{IV})_k)

T = term phrase (NP), IV = one-place verb and t = sentence

*Himself*₁ is viewed here as a term operator that maps terms onto terms. This seems the most reasonable treatment as far as Modern English and Modern German are concerned, where *himself*₁ is a purely grammatical element with little lexical content. In other languages the situation is not so clear. The element corresponding to *himself*₁ is often a lexical noun meaning 'body', 'head', 'core' or 'heart'. And even in German and English, there exist expressions like *Franco's Selbst*, *Franco's self* and *my (own) self* with approximately the same value but with a quite different categorial makeup. In analogy to other attributive constructions such as genitives and adjectives a case could conceivably be made here for regarding the intensifier as a term phrase and the co-constituent as the modifier, i.e. as a term operator that maps terms onto terms. The semantics we will propose, however, corresponds to the first mentioned syntactic analysis. On the other hand, one could regard *himself*₁ as an expression introduced by a rule of quantification as Karttunen & Karttunen (1977) have done for *even*. Their primary motivation for this step is of a semantic nature; the conventional implicature added to sentences by *even* depends on two factors: (a) the *scope* of *even*, i.e. the open sentence, and (b) the *focus* of *even*, i.e. the element of an appropriate category accompanied by *even* that replaces the free variable in the open sentence. This approach rightly regards the contribution of *even* to be some constant addition that depends only on the focus. But we have argued that the additive contributions of *himself*₁, *himself*₂ and *himself*₃ vary depending on the category of their focused constituents. That is one of the reasons we prefer to take these intensifiers as belonging to the basic expressions. Furthermore, by taking the intensifiers to be basic expressions of different syntactic categories, we can account naturally for their different syntactic behaviour, whereas a treatment analogous to Karttunen & Karttunen's syncategorematic particle *even* would not allow us to predict the syntactically manifest properties of position, constituency, prosody and agreement.

Before turning to a discussion of the referential properties of the intensifier, let us observe that the analysis of term operators presupposes a cogent conception of how to deal with terms. We shall let the translation of proper names denote the individual property set; *John* and *Franco* become $\lambda PP\{j\}$ and $\lambda PP\{f\}$ respectively (cf. Bennett 1975). General terms, such as

every man, will denote those properties which are universally possessed by men, i.e. $\lambda P \forall x (man'(x) \rightarrow P\{x\})$.

One other detail can be handled at this point. Since *himself*₁ is being viewed here as a term operator in English, we can write the following rule of functional application and translation.

- (91a) If $\alpha \in P_T$ and $him_n self_1 \in B_{T/T}$, then $F_{16} (him_n self_1, \alpha) \in P_T$, where $F_{16} (him_n self_1, \alpha) = \alpha \text{ } him_n self_1$.

In order to account for the gender, number and person agreement between head and intensifier, a copying rule like Montague's (S3) for relative clauses could be employed.

- (91b) If $\alpha \in P_T$ and $him_n self_1 \in B_{T/T}$ and α and $him_n self_1$ translate into α' and $him_n self'_1$ respectively, then $F_{16} (him_n self_1, \alpha)$ translates into $him_n self'_1 (\wedge \alpha')$.

Let us first consider cases of the co-occurrence of *himself*₁ and non-anaphoric NP's since the additional problem of pronominalization can be avoided. The data in Sections 3 and 4 above indicated that *himself*₁ hinges on the referential properties of the governing terms as follows: (a) the NP must denote something that is identifiable; (b) the NP cannot be a head of an imperative, a vocative, a generic, a general term or a nonreferential indefinite description; (c) the NP cannot be a predicate nominal in identity sentences (cf. **De Gaulle was the King of France himself*₁).

The common ground in all these cases, we think, is that the focus is on individuals and not on their properties. It is thus not surprising that proper names head the list of such intensified NP's since they exhibit the characteristics of identifiability, singularity, definiteness, high referentiality, autonomous reference and lack of scope like no other term type. Definite descriptions, though they share many of these referential traits, can differ from proper names by having variable scope in intensional contexts. The following sentences illustrate this phenomenon:

- (92a) *The President is going to be elected by the Senate.*
 (b) *I want to talk to the chairman of the hospital board.*
 (c) *Most people are going to vote for the President.*
 (d) *My wife must be an heiress.*
 (e) *Lizzy Borden plans to shave her husband.*

Each is said to have an intensional interpretation, i.e. whatever individual the definite description picks out in that world, he will have the property expressed, and an extensional interpretation, i.e. the actual individual has that property expressed. Consider 92a: Either it is the case that whatever

individual is to become President, he will be elected by the Senate, or that the current President is about to be re-elected. As is well-known, in the first instance, *is going to* has *the* in its scope and in the second, the reverse is true. But it does not appear to have been often discussed that definite descriptions such as those above can refer extensionally to roles (offices, personal relationships etc.) and not just to the individuals that play or can play these roles. This use of the every-day concept 'role' is thus not exactly identical with 'intension', which has traditionally been equated with role. This distinction is important in discussing the interaction of intensifiers and definite descriptions in intensional contexts because *himself*₁, as a rule, resolves possible ambiguities in favor of the extensional reading if the reference is to individuals, cf. (93).

- (93a) *The President himself is going to be elected by the Senate.*
- (b) *Most people are going to vote for the President himself.*
- (c) *My wife herself must be an heiress.*

In (93a) and (93b) we are anticipating a re-election of the current President, and in (93c) only the epistemic reading of the modal is suggested. But, one should not let himself be led down the primrose path to believe (as we first were) that things are always so simple. Consider (94).

- (94a) *I want to talk to the chairman of the hospital board himself, whoever he is.*
- (b) *My girlfriend can be poor, but my wife herself must be an heiress.*

Despite the presence of *himself*₁, the definite descriptions still seem to require the intensional interpretation. However, in each case that we have discovered, it is the role itself that is being emphasized (i.e. contrasted with a less remarkable role) without any reference to the individuals who might have the properties of filling these roles.

These observations on the extensionalizing function of *himself*₁ can account for the fact that generics, general terms and non-referring expressions cannot be intensified. These terms cannot be reduced to names of uniquely identifiable individuals. Furthermore, vocatives and imperatives are clearly different from demonstrative exclamations like *Caesar himself*, because they are presumably not used to identify but rather to address. Some superficially indefinite NP's, on the other hand, can, nevertheless, be intensified if the phrase has autonomous or vivid reference by virtue of the context of use, cf. (24). Personal pronouns are also "highly referential" according to Keenan (1976:319) and we now turn our discussion to them.

In a series of articles the logicians Hintikka and Castañeda have discussed the peculiarities of *he himself*, cf. Castañeda (1966) and Hintikka

(1970). Hintikka (1970: 82) says to this question:

in ['he himself' statements] we are speaking of the individual in question, not of whoever happens to be referred to by a term.

This claim dovetails with the observations that we have also been able to make about this construction. Though the two logicians ultimately wind up differing in their analyses, they agree about the fact that the locutions *he himself* or the full form, for example, *the chairman of the hospital board himself*, demand a de re interpretation. Whatever binds *he*, this pronoun must refer to that same individual even when *he* is in an opaque environment; the Law of Substitutivity of Identicals (Leibniz' Law) must hold strictly. Consider the sentences:

- | | | |
|------|--|--|
| (95) | <i>Some chairmen of the hospital boards believe that</i> | |
| (a) | <i>they themselves</i> | } <i>should preside at board meetings.</i> |
| (b) | <i>they</i> | |
| (c) | <i>chairmen</i> | |

In the interpretation of (95a) through (95c) we note a decreasing degree of extensionality. The expression *chairmen* in the belief context of (95c) can denote any past, present or future office holders whose presiding is compatible with what some chairmen think should be the case. *They* in (95b), on the other hand, is ambiguous between extensional and intensional reference: (a) the current chairmen believe that they should preside at board meetings even if they should some day lose office; or (b) as in (95c), the person elected chairman should preside. When the intensifier *himself*₁ is added, as in (95a), then the intensional reading is not possible.

Crucial for the following analysis are the observations made in Partee (1975) that pronouns can arise from two sources, (a) variable binding, and (b) deletion (pronouns of laziness). The examples above indicate that pronouns of the latter type are usually incompatible with *himself*₁. Whenever an intensional context can interact with the full noun phrase (quantifier phrase or definite description) which is the source of the pronoun of laziness, this pronoun cannot accept the intensifier *himself*₁. The reason for this prohibition is quite clear; lazy pronouns are merely proxies for noun phrases that are potentially intensional, i.e. those whose extensions may vary from world to world, and, as we have shown (cf. (92–5)), the referential contribution of intensifiers is precisely to indicate that this cannot be the case. In other words, intensified NP's always behave like constant individual concepts, like the most unimpeachable kinds of proper names. This explains why the value of the intensifier when applied to

proper names or first and second person pronouns derives exclusively from its modal contribution.

We now turn to the question of retailoring a few aspects of Montague's presentation in PTQ in order to account for the following case types: the lack of intensifiers operating on (a) proper names expressing momentary, personal, or perhaps bodily manifestations in identity sentences (cf. (71–72)); (b) definite descriptions that denote intensional objects (cf. (92–95)); and (c) quantifier phrases (cf. (22–23)), except for *de re* readings of indefinite descriptions. One common feature is absent in all of these cases; they are not “logically determinate” (cf. Montague 1974:264) because their interpretations will have extensions that are not invariant with respect to possible worlds and moments of time. One implication of this observation is that Montague's meaning postulate $\forall u \Box [u = \alpha]$, where α is *j*, *m*, *b*, or *n*, cannot be allowed to apply to proper names such as *Mr Hyde* or *the Morning Star*, even though such expressions must be considered to be in the same syntactic category as *John*, *Mary*, *Bill*, *ninety*, *Dr Jekyll* and *Venus*. An easy solution would be to subcategorize proper names into those that are logically determinate and those that are not. For all these cases, the important feature that a term must have to be intensifiable is that this term denote a constant function, i.e. one that maps any world-time point onto a single individual from $D_{e,A,I,J}$. Therefore *himself*₁ functions like a filter that passes terms denoting constant individual concepts and rejects all others.

The model used to interpret intensified terms must therefore reflect the property that Hintikka (1970:83) has called “individuation by acquaintance”:

... often someone (say *b*) can in fact truly be said to know this or that *of a definite individual*, and not just of an individual described in a certain way. This presupposes, however, that *b* knows enough to identify (individuate) the individual in question. Hence if this individual is given a name or some other label, this label provides us with the needed substitution-value.

Although we do not wish to expand the PTQ fragment to include plural expressions, there seems to us no obvious reason to believe that the method of individuation by acquaintance would not be applicable for a suitably enlarged fragment. One would only have to require that the denotation of definite plural terms would be constructed differently than that of universally quantified ones.

One last problem that deserves mention at this point concerns the intensification of pronouns. As the immediately preceding discussion has demonstrated why phrases such as *no one himself* are semantically given no interpretation, it remains to accommodate the bizarre fact that

intensification is sometimes possible behind a pronoun but not possible behind its antecedent.

- (96) *No one (*himself) believes that he (himself) should preside at the meetings.*

Since all bound variables are of type e , they are for any particular assignment of values logically determinate, and can be treated analogously to proper names for the purposes of intensification.

Montague's PTQ framework provides two different possibilities for introducing terms into sentences; either they are combined directly with IV-phrases (rule S4) *inter alia*, or they are combined by the rule of quantification S14 with an open formula, thus replacing an appropriate free variable. According to the first alternative term types like *no one*, *all unicorns* can be syntactically combined with $him_n self_1$, but, as was shown above, remain without interpretation. Similarly, $him_n self_1$ combines with pronominal terms, and the rule of quantification S14 could then introduce *no one* to yield sentence (96) with head-bound *himself*, which we have characterized as ill-formed or uninterpretable.

- (97)
-
- ```

graph TD
 A["no one himself φ's, 14"] --- B["no one"]
 A --- C["he_n him_n self_1 φ's, 4"]
 C --- D["he_n him_n self_1"]
 C --- E["φ"]
 D --- F["he_n"]
 D --- G["him_n self_1"]

```

However, the ill-formedness of (97), we contend, is merely a fact of the syntactic surface structure of English (and, perhaps, other languages). If this same structure is realized in a less compact manner (cf. 98),

- (98) *No one is such that he himself φ's*

the resulting version is appropriate both syntactically and semantically. These observations can be nicely accommodated if Montague's rule of quantification S14 is slightly modified so that it can look not only for the first  $he_n$  but also for the complex term consisting of  $he_n$  and  $him_n self_1$ , which is then replaced accordingly. Therefore, no English sentence with underlying  $he_n$  and  $him_n self_1$  as co-constituents makes it to the surface, if S14 has applied to it. The result of such a derivation would thus be (99) rather than (97):

- (99) *no one φ's, 14*

Although we do not wish to pursue it, such derivations could well be the

sources of emphasized but “self-less” terms, which Cantrall (1973) claims are related to *self-intensified* terms (cf. (100)).

(100) *NO ONE believes that he should preside.*

As was stated above, *himself*<sub>1</sub> contains beyond its referential contribution to terms a modal contribution. It seems quite clear that this aspect of the meaning of the head-bound intensifier touches on common ground with *even* (German *selbst*, *sogar*).

(101a) *Even the President came.*

(b) *The President himself came.*

(c) *Even the President himself came.*

We shall not take over, however, a variation of the ‘logical’ analyses of *even* in terms of presupposition, cf. Horn (1969), for reasons given in Fauconnier (1975:364). In fact we feel that a start on the modal contribution of intensive *self* is attainable with Fauconnier’s pragmatic scales. According to him (1975:364) the function of *even* is to mark the existence of a pragmatic probability scale with the term phrase (or other phrase type, cf. Karttunen and Karttunen 1977) modified by *even* at the lowest point with respect to the propositional schema (*x came*). Since the effect of the *even*-scale is equivalent to universal quantification, (101a) then allows the pragmatic inference that anyone higher on the scale than the President came. Fauconnier (1975:365) pleads that the likelihood scale is a presupposition of sentences with *even*. Taken at its face value, this conclusion overgeneralizes since there are two equally natural negations of (101a), here (102), and they have quite different consequences.

(102a) *Not even the President came.*

(b) *Even the President didn’t come.*

Both implicate that no one came, but differ with respect to the dimension scaled (coming or not coming) and the position of the President on the respective scales. Our intuition about (101a) and (102) is as follows:

(101’a) Assertion: *came* (*p*)

Implication:  $\forall x(\text{Probability}(\text{came}(x)) > \text{Probability}(\text{came}(p)))$

(102’a) Assertion:  $\sim(\text{came}(p))$

Implication:  $\forall x(\text{Probability}(\text{came}(p)) > \text{Probability}(\text{came}(x)))$


(b) Assertion:  $\sim(\text{came}(p))$

Implication:  $\forall x(\text{Probability}(\sim \text{came}(x)) > \text{Probability}(\sim \text{came}(p)))$



We will not pursue an analysis of *even* further at this time and instead turn our attention to applying the scale principle to *himself*<sub>1</sub>.

We would like to suggest that *himself*<sub>1</sub> associates a pragmatic scale with propositions that is graduated in terms of the speaker's expectation (remarkability) of the involvement of certain individuals in the actions, states or processes denoted by the schemata. Thus associated with the sentence (101b) is the scale (103a).



The sentence (101b) claims that the individual  $p$  is lowest on the expectancy scale and thus implicates that coming is more expected of others than of the President. Notice that in contrast to (101a), it does not necessarily follow from (101b) that if the President came, then everyone else also came. Probability and expectancy, though obviously related, are not equivalent. It appears that the dimension of expectancy constitutes a less coherent continuum than that of probability. Beyond that, however, expectancy involves a modal contribution not found in probability. This factor is the reason behind the difference in acceptability of (104a) and (104b).

(104a) *The President himself ordered the executions.*

(b) *?Even the President ordered the execution.*

Thus in (104a), it does not follow that everyone besides the President ordered the execution, only that it was more expected of others. The ultimate responsibility for executions can lie only with a single person (or empowered group),<sup>12</sup> whereas the sense of *even* in (104b) is to distribute the agency of ordering executions over the President and all more probable persons, which is slightly incompatible with our common-sense understanding of the nature of orders.

As for negated sentences containing *himself*<sub>1</sub>, cf. (105),

(105) *The President himself didn't come,*

we note that they present great difficulty in understanding. One probable factor in this difficulty is that negation is effectively repeated. Moreover, it is unclear what happens to the expectancy scale when a sentence is negated. Our intuitions about (105) are that an ambiguity results as to whether the President is high point or low point on the expectancy scale of not coming.

In conclusion we note again that we have made no attempt to fully integrate the modal and referential sides of the value of *himself*<sub>1</sub>. Such a reduction to a 'logical' representation may in principle be possible, but would probably not be very fruitful at this point.

### 7. A SKETCH OF THE VALUE OF *himself*<sub>2</sub>

The syntax and translation rule for *himself*<sub>2</sub> can be stated quite simply. We have accumulated enough evidence above to regard this intensifier as an adverb, that is to say an ad-operator on a one-place verb. Therefore, it belongs to the category of basic expressions IV/IV. We note in passing, however, that in some German structures, cf. (5b), *selbst*<sub>2</sub> might have to be assigned to the second category TV/TV, an operator on two-place verbs, as well. This property extends to all German ad-verbs (cf. Edmondson and Plank 1975:chapter 7). The rule of functional application in this case is as follows (cf. Montague's S10):

- (106) If  $\alpha \in P_{IV}$  and  $him_n self_2 \in B_{IV/IV}$ , then  $F_7(him_n self_2, \alpha) \in P_{IV}$ , where  $F_7(him_n self_2, \alpha) = \alpha him_n self_2$ .

To account for the fact that intensifier adverbs like *himself* are the only adverbs that agree with the subject in person, number and gender, one could expand Montague's rule S4 to include agreement between subjects and intensifiers and not just subjects and verbs (cf. Bennett's 1975:12 treatment of the agreement of true reflexive pronouns).

The translation rule for *himself*<sub>2</sub> is just as straight-forward as for other adverbs (cf. Montague's T10).

- (107) If  $\alpha \in P_{IV}$  and  $himself_2 \in B_{IV/IV}$ , then  $him_n self_2(\alpha)$  is translated as  $him_n self'_2(\wedge \alpha)$ .

As for its semantic 'value', *himself*<sub>2</sub> differs from head-bound intensifiers in lacking any referential meaning component. Its contribution instead centers around notions like the directness of agency or the directness of involvement in states or results of actions. The connection to *himself*<sub>1</sub> is to be found in the head-bound's modal aspect. Remember that on the expectancy scale, the direct participation of highly remarkable individuals was


contrasted with the non-participation of less remarkable persons. The critical factors at work in *himself*<sub>2</sub> can best be illustrated by reconsidering the disambiguating force of this intensifier in sentences like:

- (108a) *Ironside rolled over the edge.*  
 (b) *Ironside rolled over the edge himself.*  
 (109a) *Albert came to the conclusion that  $E = mc^2$ .*  
 (b) *Albert came to the conclusion himself that  $E = mc^2$ .*

We notice that *himself*<sub>2</sub> serves to exclude those readings of (108a) and (109a) that place the ultimate responsibility for Ironside's death/Albert's knowledge on others. Once again pragmatic scales can be employed to relate properties of *himself*<sub>2</sub> that have not been related in former treatments.

A great many predicates are simply vague about the degree of agency, involvement or independent causation expressed by their subjects. Normally, no definite consequences or implicatures concerning this dimension can be drawn from the examples (108a) and (109a). It is when agency, involvement or causation is in question, though, that *himself*<sub>2</sub> typically appears. This modifier associates a scale of directness with propositional schemata and ranks the subject term phrase as the most direct. For the example (108b) we have:

- (110a) most directly involved agent or experiencer



more indirectly involved agents or experiencers.

- (110b) *x rolled over the edge.*

The agency/experiencer distinction is a function of the predicate type; non-stative predicates like *roll* when intensified determine their subjects as most agentive; intensified statives as in

- (111) *The President heard the news himself.*

exclude anyone else but the most directly involved experiencer. Quite often the scale of increasing directness is paralleled by decreasing expectancy. Thus (112a) is usually more appropriate than (112b):

- (112a) *The King plowed the Royal fields himself.*  
 (b) *?The serfs plowed the Royal fields themselves.*

One expects that serfs are more directly involved in plowing than kings. There appears to be some overlap of the expectancy scale of *himself*<sub>1</sub> onto *himself*<sub>2</sub> in this respect although expectancy is probably secondary with *himself*<sub>2</sub>.

Let us now turn to the interaction of the directness scale and negation. In the sentences

- (113a) *Ironside didn't roll over the edge himself.*  
 (b) *Ironside didn't roll over the edge.*  
 (114a) *Albert didn't come to the conclusion himself that  $E = mc^2$ .*  
 (b) *Albert didn't come to the conclusion that  $E = mc^2$ .*

quite different consequences can be drawn about what was the case. Ironside rolled over the edge in (113a) even if he was helped and similarly for (114a). These facts show that what is presupposed in *himself*<sub>2</sub> sentences is the positive unintensified sentence and what is asserted is the pragmatic scale or the reversal of the scale if the sentence is negated. Since negation results in a reversal of the scale, we rightly predict that (115) describes (114a).

- (115) Presupposition: *Albert came to the conclusion that  $E = mc^2$ .*  
 Assertion: most directly involved experiencer
- 
- $\vdots$   
 $x_2$   
 $\vdots$   
 $x_1$   
 $\vdots$   
 $a$
- more indirectly involved experiencer

The scale analysis of the value of *himself*<sub>2</sub> also accounts for sentences with *of-himself*<sub>2</sub> or *by-himself*<sub>2</sub> phrases and their German counterparts. These phrases indicate that on the scale of directly involved agency the subject was highest, and implicate that no other individual was more directly involved. One might wish to speculate that the second sense of *by-himself*<sub>2</sub> phrases, i.e. those with the value 'isolated' or 'alone', could come from the combination of a local adverbial sense of *by* plus the sense of 'most directly involved experiencer' for *himself*<sub>2</sub>.

Finally, we take up the question of the linkage between intensifiers and reflexive pronouns. One can see the common ground in these two phenomena most clearly in the value of *himself*<sub>2</sub>. This intensifier relates

actions or states with the participants in such actions or states in a particular way. The most direct involvement of an individual in an action that requires two or more participants is to fill both roles simultaneously. Comparing

(116a) *The President heard the news himself.*

(b) *The President heard himself.*

we note that in (116a) the President is the most directly involved experiencer in the hearing. But, who in (116b) is more directly involved in experiencing, i.e. hearing, an utterance than its producer? The interchange of the degree of involvement and intensification is also quite apparent for the much discussed case of middle verbs.

(117a) *The door opened.*

(b) \**The door opened by John.*

(c) *The door was opened by John.*

(d) *The door opened by itself.*

With respect to the degree of involvement of an agent, one can characterize these sentences as follows: (117a) is neutral as to whether there is more direct involvement of an 'agent' than the door itself; (117b) is unacceptable because in standard English the active voice of the verb and a marker for any more direct involvement than that of the overt subject cannot simultaneously occur (this function is encoded with the passive, cf. (117c)); and (117d), on the other hand, is perfectly well-formed since it is the function of *himself*<sub>2</sub> to exclude other agency.

#### 8. A SKETCH OF THE VALUE OF *himself*<sub>3</sub>

As we said in Section 3 above, *himself*<sub>3</sub> differs from *himself*<sub>1</sub> by being adverbial and from *himself*<sub>2</sub> by being relatively independent of the lexical semantics of the predicate. There seems no problem about the syntactic status here. *Himself*<sub>3</sub> belongs to the same category as *himself*<sub>2</sub>, i.e. IV/IV. Montague's S10 cannot account for the placement of English adverbs in general, since this rule serializes all adverbs to the right of the intransitive verb. To remedy this situation we could associate two different serialization functions with S10, and subcategorize the adverbs accordingly, so that in the last part of (106) we would have:  $F_{7a}(him_nself_2, \alpha) = \alpha\ him_nself_2$ ; and  $F_{7b}(him_nself_3, \alpha) = him_nself_3\ \alpha$ .<sup>13</sup> We shall ignore further details of *himself*<sub>3</sub> placement relative to the auxiliary, but we note that the agreement of *himself*<sub>3</sub> is accommodatable as sketched above for *himself*<sub>2</sub>.

With respect to the semantic contribution of *himself*<sub>3</sub> we note that this intensifier, unlike *himself*<sub>2</sub>, does not interfere with the truth conditions of the containing sentence. The contribution of *himself*<sub>3</sub>, we feel, resembles to some extent that of *himself*<sub>1</sub>, the major difference being the absence of a reference-related effect. Without going into details, we believe that a start on the value of *himself*<sub>3</sub> is capturable with pragmatic scales of expectation. What is being scaled here is not the involvement of certain individuals as opposed to others in actions, states or processes, but rather the appearance of one and the same individual in different semantic roles. The individual, or more generally, entity on the scale is the subject exclusively; and the role relations are determined by the predicate. We employ the concept 'role' approximately as it is used in defining case frames; some of the more common roles thus are, for example, *Agent*, *Patient* (or *Non-Agent*), *Recipient*, *Benefactive* etc. From some of the examples discussed above (cf. (54b)) it ought to be clear that further roles are necessary that are not so familiar from case grammar, e.g. standard of comparison and compared person.

*Himself*<sub>3</sub> associates with a proposition such as (118a) a pragmatic expectancy scale in terms of agentivity with respect to poisoning, the activity denoted by the predicate.

(118a) *Lucretia was poisoned by Cesare.*

|               |  |                                     |
|---------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| (b) +Agentive |  | most expected role of subject term  |
| -Agentive     |  | least expected role of subject term |

Although this representation might suggest a continuum of roles involving a decreasing degree of agentivity, in most cases *himself*<sub>3</sub> aids in contrasting only two discrete roles. Notice that sentence (118a) with *himself*<sub>3</sub> is appropriate only in carefully prepared circumstances; mere role reversal is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, as (119) shows:

(119) \**Lucretia left Florence and was herself poisoned in the coach.*

A sufficient condition for the use of *himself*<sub>3</sub> would require that the semantic roles are not contrasted with respect to two completely unrelated propositions. The necessary relationship between the two propositions need not be complete identity; in fact, a conventional implicature can often suffice, as is seen in (120).

(120) *W. C. Fields, who had himself always hated the place, is buried in Philadelphia.*

This relatedness-of-propositions condition is doubtless a natural consequence of the analysis sketched above. For how can expectancy about roles arise if the propositions in question are unrelatable?

In the case of *himself*<sub>1</sub> and *himself*<sub>2</sub> we have relied on the negation test to cleave apart presuppositional and assertive parts of intensified sentences. As shown in (52) above, *himself*<sub>3</sub> does not in all instances go unscathed by negation. It is obvious, though, that (52b) rather than (52c) illustrates the much more usual interaction of *himself*<sub>3</sub> and negation, and here negation is clearly associated with the proposition and not with the role-expectancy scale, which reminds us of *himself*<sub>1</sub>. When negation precedes *himself*<sub>3</sub>, however, then the most likely reaction to such sentences is confusion. Applying negation to the role-expectancy scale seems incompatible with the conceptual nature of this particular scale. The reason for this might be that negation reverses pragmatic scales (cf. *himself*<sub>1</sub>), and in these scales role-expectancies have already been reversed once.

## 9. FINAL REMARKS

In this paper we have argued that English (and perhaps German) possesses three distinct intensifiers that stand in some relation to each other and to the reflexive pronoun. One of our goals has been to establish clear-cut differences between *himself*<sub>1</sub>, *himself*<sub>2</sub>, and *himself*<sub>3</sub>; the other was to speculate about why the functions of intensification and reflexivization are merged in the encoding of English and many other natural languages.

In our considerations one notion has continuously recurred, the notion of *subject*. As is well-known, subject is a crucial category in reflexivization. The antecedent of a reflexive pronoun is typically a subject. Head-bound intensifiers need to make use of the category of subject; they tend to be used more on subject NP's than on NP's in other roles. German speakers invariably identify the occurrence of a *selbst* in the predicate as a case of *selbst*<sub>2</sub> and rarely as a case of *selbst*<sub>1</sub> modifying an object. *Himself*<sub>2</sub>/*himself*<sub>3</sub> are unique among verbal modifiers in English in agreeing with the subject NP.

In general we can say that the three intensifiers tend to make use of properties that cluster along two dimensions of properties ascribed to subjects in Keenan (1976). *Himself*<sub>1</sub> hinges on traits of the subject in its preferred role as topic: (a) autonomous, absolute, 'vivid' reference, (b) wide scope, (c) definiteness, i.e. pre-established reference or identification ('old information'). *Himself*<sub>2</sub> is associated with the subject in its preferred semantic role as agent or cause, and *himself*<sub>3</sub> likewise interacts with the role structure of subjects. So if one wonders why it is that the various

intensifier constructions have exactly these properties that we have taken great pains to assemble in this paper and no other properties or combinations of properties, here is an answer. All intensifiers are subject-oriented, hence this neat coincidence of the properties of subjects and intensifiers.

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## NOTES

\* Authors' names appear in alphabetical order. – For their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper we would like to thank Östen Dahl, Hans-Werner Eroms, D. Terence Langendoen, Willi Mayerthaler, Tom Perry, and particularly the anonymous referee for *Linguistics & Philosophy*.

<sup>1</sup> 'Spurious reflexives' (*As for myself, I favor . . .*) could seem to suggest themselves as a source of these sentence-initial intensifiers. Spurious reflexives have been claimed (by Ross 1970) to constitute evidence for higher performative sentences containing a coreferential subject *I*. But it is exactly on account of this obligatory first-person coreferentiality that sentences like \**As for himself, he favors . . .*, the alleged source of (7a), appear to be ungrammatical. A second reason for rejecting the spurious reflexive hypothesis is that the German equivalent of (7a), viz. (7b), does not even contain a reflexive, and that the German counterpart of spurious-reflexive constructions, viz. *Was mich/ihn/\* sich betrifft*, has neither a reflexive nor the intensifier *selbst*.

<sup>2</sup> This does not mean, however, that the intensifier itself necessarily has to have main stress; Gundel (1975:104) mentions such examples as *I myself would have never SAID that*.

<sup>3</sup> We were unable to consult Leskosky (1972) and Klenin (1974). Among transformationalists Ross (1974) also touches upon intensive reflexives, as does Postal (1971). Chomsky (1970), Chapin (1967) and Meys (1975) deal with *self* in the context of word formation, a topic that we will take up in Section 5. Non-transformational, but still explicit, recent accounts may be found in Anscombe (1973) and Martin (1975).

<sup>4</sup> But cf. the example quoted by Jespersen (1961, VII:172): *Nicolas of whom himself there will be plenty to say*. This surely can be no instance of *himself*<sub>2</sub>. – Incidentally, the restriction against non-subjects also holds for NP's containing a WH-pronoun: \**I met a man whose mother herself I wouldn't leave for 10 minutes with a baby*.

<sup>5</sup> In the reading where *Jones* is non-agentive.

<sup>6</sup> *Duzen* denotes an activity for which it scarcely makes sense to allow others to do it in one's stead.

<sup>7</sup> Both occurrences of *selbst* appear to be possible in the German equivalent of (55b), *Der Präsident versprach seinen Freunden, (selbst) die Bänder (selbst) zu löschen*. But this is simply due to the variable serialization of adverbials in German; the leftmost *selbst* is certainly no *selbst*<sub>1</sub>, modifying the understood complement subject.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. also our discussion in Section 6 that draws on similar suggestions by Castañeda and Hintikka.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Lewis's (1971) counterpart theory.

<sup>10</sup> The following German examples have paraphrases where the equivalent of *alone*, viz. *allein(e)*, as a matter of fact replaces the intensive *selbst*: *Der Papst starb von allein* (=74b), *Eierfrüchte wachsen von alleine* (=75b). Although *allein* in other contexts usually means 'all alone', these variants still do not translate the "all alone" reading of English *by-himself* constructions.

<sup>11</sup> The not exactly reflexive meanings required here would be something like this: 'the problem contains its solution' (*self-explaining*), 'someone's remarks are intended to congratulate someone' (*self-congratulatory*), 'a prophecy caused a state of affairs that fulfilled the



prophecy' (*self-fulfilling*). A reflexive source for *self-educated* would not be well-formed because passive is incompatible with non-emphatic reflexivization.

<sup>12</sup> Behaghel (1923:334–5) already touches upon the important notions of exclusion of other agents (negation) and remarkability. His analysis does not, however, distinguish between *himself*<sub>1</sub> and *himself*<sub>2</sub>. For the notion of exclusion cf. also Anscombe (1973).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bartsch (1975), where such subcategorization has been suggested for various kinds of adverbs.

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