1. Introduction

Negative quantifiers are known to give rise to split scope readings, where another operator, in particular a modal, takes scope in between the negative and the existential meaning component. As illustrated in the paraphrases of the following examples from German and English, the negation takes wide scope over the modal while the existential is interpreted with narrow scope under the *de dicto* reading.

(1) Bei der Operation braucht *kein* Anästhesist anwesend sein. [German]
    ‘It is not required that an anaesthetist be present during the surgery.’

(2) The company need fire *no* employees. [from POTTS 2000]
    ‘The company is not obligated to fire any employees.’

The most prominent reading of sentence (1), for instance, is the one paraphrased saying that the presence of an anaesthetist is not obligatorily required. It is not about a particular anaesthetist, but rather about the presence of some anaesthetist or other, corresponding to a *de dicto* reading of the indefinite. At the same time, the modal is interpreted in the scope of negation, expressing the absence of an obligation. This split reading cannot be derived under the standard analysis of negative indefinites as negative quantifiers where the negation and the existential quantifier form a lexical unit. Several analyses have been proposed, some maintaining the assumption that negative quantifiers are lexical units (DE SWART 2000; ABELS & MARTÍ 2010) others decomposing them into a negation and an indefinite (among others JACOBS 1980; RULLMANN 1995; PENKA 2011).

As has been observed by DE SWART (2000) and ABELS & MARTÍ (2010), split scope readings do not only arise with negative quantifiers, but also with other downward monotonic quantifiers like *few* and numerals modified by *fewer than* or *at most*.

(3) The inmates of this prison are allowed to write *few* letters.
‘The inmates of this prison are not allowed to write more than a small number of letters.’

(4) At MIT one needs to publish **fewer than three** books in order to get tenure. [HACKL 2000]

‘At MIT one doesn’t need to publish more than two books in order to get tenure.’

(5) A muslim can marry **at most four** women. [from de SWART 2000]

‘A muslim cannot marry more than four women.’

The fact that downward monotonic quantifiers in general give rise to split scope readings has been taken as an argument against approaches that derive split scope readings by decomposing the quantifiers into a negation and a quantificational part. Fewer than three for instance would have to be decomposed into negation and more than two, which is not morphologically transparent and thus seems implausible.

This paper focuses on split readings arising with **at most**. What makes **at most** particularly interesting is the fact that **at most** gives rise to a split scope reading in combination with possibility modals, but not with necessity modals. This contrast in the availability of split readings, which does not arise for any other downward entailing quantifier, is illustrated in (6) and (7). While the most salient reading of sentence (6) is the one where **at most** splits its scope across the possibility modal to expresses prohibition of checking out more than ten books, (7) does not express permission of reading ten or fewer books.\footnote{The speaker insecurity reading might be seen as expressing negation of the obligation of reading more than ten books. However, this reading is not authoritative, which would be required for granting permission to read ten or fewer books. The difference between the readings will become clearer in the discussion in section 2 and 3.}

In fact, sentences where **at most** occurs under a necessity modal seem odd and are harder to interpret than combinations of **at most** with possibility modals (see experimental studies by MCNABB & PENKA 2014a,b).

(6) You **can** check out **at most ten** books from the library.

‘You are not allowed to check out more than ten books from the library.’

(7) \footnote{You have to read **at most ten** books for this class.}

<=/> You are not required to read more than ten books for this class.

In order to explain this asymmetry in the availability of split readings arising with **at most**, I build on a recent approach to the semantics of superlative modifiers (BÜRING 2008;
It has been proposed to account for a characteristic of *at least* and *at most* that makes them a particularly interesting object of study in semantics and pragmatics, namely the fact that they give rise to ignorance inferences. But in its basic version this approach does not account for the interaction of *at most* with modals and cannot derive the split reading of *at most* under possibility modals. I propose a modified analysis of *at most* where *at most* is decomposed into a degree negation and its positive antonym *at least*. This analysis provides a principled account of split readings arising with *at most* as well as ignorance inferences and their (non-) obviation under modals.

The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets the stage for the analysis by discussing superlative modifiers and the ignorance inferences they give rise to. It also introduces a pragmatic approach to ignorance inferences analysing them as quantity implicatures and shows that it successfully accounts for the interaction of *at least* with modals, but not for *at most*. In section 3, I propose to decompose *at most* into an antonymizing operator and *at least* and show that this successfully accounts for the interaction of *at least* with modals under the pragmatic approach. Section 4 addresses the question whether split scope of different downward entailing quantifiers should receive a unified analysis. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.

2. Superlative modifiers and ignorance inferences

2.1. Speaker insecurity and authoritative readings of *at least* and *at most*

The superlative modifiers *at least* and *at most* have recently received a lot of attention in the semantics and pragmatics literature. What makes them particularly interesting is the fact that in most contexts, they imply speaker ignorance, i.e. they convey that the speaker is not sure about the precise value under discussion (see Geurts & Nouwen 2007, Nouwen 2010). Sentence (8), for instance, conveys that the speaker is not sure how many beers exactly John had last night. The only thing she is sure about is that the number is not less than three. But for all she knows, John might have had four or more beers.

(8)  John had **at least** three beers last night.

In certain environments, however, the implication of speaker uncertainty is absent. In particular, it has been observed that ignorance inferences can be suppressed in certain combinations of *at least* and *at most* with modals (see Geurts & Nouwen 2007). Sentence
\( \text{(9)} \), where \textit{at least} occurs under a necessity modal, has a reading which BÜRING (2008) calls authoritative. Under this reading, \( \text{(9)} \) does not convey speaker ignorance, but rather expresses that \( 10pp \) is the minimally required length of the paper. This reading is graphically illustrated in (9a), where ‘-----’ signifies the range of permissible paper lengths — which I will also refer to as deontic range — and \( 10pp \) is its lower bound.

\( \text{(9)} \) The paper \textbf{has to} be \textbf{at least} 10 pages long.

a. ‘10 pages is the minimally required length of the paper’

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[--------]} & \quad \text{authoritative reading} \\
10pp
\end{align*}
\]

b. ‘According to what the speaker knows, the minimally required length might be 10 pages or it might be more.’

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[////////--------]} & \quad \text{speaker insecurity reading} \\
10pp
\end{align*}
\]

Sentence (9) has another reading conveying speaker ignorance, which can be brought out by prefixing the utterance with “I don’t know exactly. But I think …”. Under this reading, which BÜRING (2008) calls speaker insecurity reading, the speaker is unsure about the minimally required length of the paper. For all she knows, the lower bound of permissible paper lengths could be \( 10pp \) or more. This reading is graphically illustrated in (9b), where ‘////////’ signifies the epistemic range, i.e. the values that for all the speaker knows might or might not be permissible. To bring out the difference between the two readings, consider a situation in which the regulations specify that only papers that are \( 15pp \) or longer will be accepted. In this situation, the sentence is judged false under the authoritative reading (9a), whereas under the speaker insecurity reading (9b) the speaker cannot be blamed for making a false statement.

Not all combinations of superlative modifiers and modals allow for both the authoritative and the speaker insecurity reading. GEURTS & NOUWEN (2007) observe that \textit{at least} in combination with necessity modals and \textit{at most} in combination with possibility modals have both the authoritative and the speaker insecurity reading, whereas possibility modals plus \textit{at least} and necessity modals plus \textit{at most} allow for the speaker insecurity reading only\(^2\). The readings that are intuitively available for the different combinations are summarized in (9) to (12).

\(^2\) The question which readings are available for the combination of necessity modal and \textit{at most} is actually more complex and will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.
The paper can be at least 10 pages long.

‘According to what the speaker knows, the maximally allowed length might be 10 pages or more.’

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{------} / & \text{speaker insecurity reading only} \\
\end{array}\]

\[10\text{pp}\]

The paper has to be at most 10 pages long.

‘According to what the speaker knows, the minimally required length might be 10 pages or less.’

\[\begin{array}{ll}
/ & \text{speaker insecurity reading only} \\
\end{array}\]

\[10\text{pp}\]

The paper can be at most 10 pages long.

a. ‘10 pages is the maximally allowed length of the paper.’

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{------} & \text{authoritative reading} \\
\end{array}\]

\[10\text{pp}\]

b. ‘According to what the speaker knows, the maximally allowed length might be 10 pages or less.’

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{------} / & \text{speaker insecurity reading} \\
\end{array}\]

\[10\text{pp}\]

The ignorance implications of at least and at most and their interaction with modals are currently subject to a lot of work in semantics and pragmatics (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Nouwen 2010 and forthcoming; Schwarz 2011 and 2013; Cohen & Krifka 2014; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013; Kennedy 2013). But none of the analyses proposed so far fully accounts for the interaction of at least and at most with modals. In this paper, I elaborate an approach that seems particularly attractive and derives ignorance as quantity implicatures. As we will see, this approaches in its basic version does not account for the interaction of at most with modals and cannot derive the spilt reading of at most under possibility modals.

2.1. Ignorance inferences as quantity implicatures

One approach to superlative modifiers, proposed by Büring (2008), Cummins & Katsos (2010), Schwarz (2011, 2013) and Kennedy (2013), derives ignorance inferences in the pragmatic component. Building on a parallel to ignorance inferences arising with disjunction, which are generally taken to be derived via Gricean reasoning, the ignorance inferences
triggered by *at least* and *at most* are analyzed as quantity implicatures. SCHWARZ (2011, 2013) spells out an analysis of superlative modifiers as degree operators and shows that ignorance inferences of *at least* and *at most* can be derived in the same way as the ignorance implications of *or* in SAUERLAND’S (2004) neo-Gricean framework. The essential ingredients of Schwarz’ analysis are the following: In the semantics, *at least* and *at most* are analyzed as degree operators expressing non-strict comparison:

(13)  
\[
\text{a. } \llbracket \text{at least} \rrbracket = \lambda d. \lambda D. \max(D) \geq d \\
\text{b. } \llbracket \text{at most} \rrbracket = \lambda d. \lambda D. \max(D) \leq d
\]

In the pragmatics, utterances with *at least* or *at most* trigger scalar alternatives which are the cross-product of substituting (i) the modified number by other numerals or measure phrases and (ii) *at least* and *at most* by each other and *exactly*.

(14)  
\[
\text{[exactly]} = \lambda d. \lambda D. \max(D) = d
\]

With these assumptions ignorance inferences are generated for unembedded occurrences of *at least* and *at most* in Sauerland’s system, where scalar implicatures and ignorance inferences are two sides of the same coin. Scalar implicatures arise if primary implicatures of the form “the speaker is not certain that \(\varphi\)”, where \(\varphi\) is a stronger scalar alternative, can be strengthened to secondary or scalar implicatures of the form “the speaker is certain that not \(\varphi\)”.

Ignorance inferences arise if the stronger alternatives are symmetric, which means that they cannot simultaneously be false while the assertion is true, or putting it differently, the assertion is equivalent to the disjunction of the stronger alternatives. This is illustrated in the following for example (15), which has the LF and the truth conditions shown in (16).

(15)  
The paper is **at least** 10 pages long.

(16)  
\[
\text{a. } \llbracket \text{[at least } 10 \text{pp]} \rrbracket = \lambda d. \lambda d. \max(D) = d
\]

\[\text{Mayr (2013) and Schwarz (2013) note that Sauerland’s algorithm needs to be revised and based on the notion of Innocent Exclusion (Fox 2007) in order to prevent the generation of unattested scalar implicatures for scalar modifiers. I neglect this issue for the purpose of this paper and circumvent the problem for Sauerland’s basic algorithm by considering just those scalar alternatives that asymmetrically entail the assertion and where the number is closest to the modified numeral.}\]
b. \( \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq 10\text{pp} \)

‘The length of the paper is 10\text{pp} or more.’

The scalar alternatives of (15) correspond to the cross-product of substituting at least by exactly or at most and by substituting 10pp by other paper lengths. Out of these, the alternatives that are more informative, i.e. asymmetrically entail the assertion, are the ones formed by substituting either at least by exactly or 10pp by 11pp.

(17) Scalar alternatives to (15):

The paper is \( \text{NumMod} n \) pages long.

where \( \text{NumMod} \in \{ \text{at least, exactly, at most} \} \)

\( n \in \{ \ldots, 9, 10, 11, \ldots \} \)

(18) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. The paper is exactly 10 pages long. \( \text{at least} \Rightarrow \text{exactly} \)

\( \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)

b. The paper is at least 11 pages long. \( 10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 11\text{pp} \)

\( \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq 11\text{pp} \quad \Leftarrow\Rightarrow \)

\( \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \)

Because the stronger alternatives in (18) are symmetric, i.e. one of them has to be true for the assertion to be true, none of the primary implicatures can be strengthened to secondary/scalar implicatures, because this would contradict the conjunction of the assertion and all the primary implicatures. Instead, the assertion and the primary implicatures taken together entail possibility implicatures. This is shown in (19), where using GAZDAR’S (1979) notation, \( K\varphi \) corresponds to ‘the speaker knows/ believes \( \varphi \)’ and \( P\varphi \) to ‘the speaker considers \( \varphi \) possible’.

(19) a. Assertion: \( K \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq 10\text{pp} \quad A \)

b. Primary implicatures: \( \neg K \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \quad \text{PI1} \)

\( \neg K \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \quad \text{PI2} \)

c. Possibility implicatures: \( P \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \) \( \text{follows from A + PI2} \)

\( P \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \) \( \text{follows from A + PI1} \)

The primary and possibility implicatures together correspond to ignorance inferences,

* For expository reasons, I make the simplifying assumption that the relevant scale is discrete, i.e. that only full-page lengths are considered.
which are of the form \( P\varphi \& P\neg\varphi \) (note that \( \neg K\varphi \) is equivalent to \( P\neg\varphi \)). According to them, the speaker does not know whether the paper is exactly 10pp long or whether the paper is more than 10pp long. Together with the assertion, this correctly reflects the meaning of sentence (15).

(20)  Ignorance implicatures generated:
   a. \( P\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \& P\neg\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)
   b. \( P\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \& P\neg\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \)

Ignorance inferences for unembedded occurrences of at most are generated in the same way, the only difference being that now the alternative with a lower numeral is symmetric to the alternative where at most is substituted by exactly.

(21)  The paper is at most 10 pages long.
   \( \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 10\text{pp} \)

(22)  Stronger scalar alternatives:
   a. The paper is exactly 10 pages long. at most \( \Rightarrow \) exactly
      \( \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)
   b. The paper is at most 9 pages long. 10pp \( \Rightarrow 9\text{pp} \)
      \( \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 9\text{pp} \) \( \iff \ast \)
      \( \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \)

(23)  Ignorance implicatures generated:
   a. \( P\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \& P\neg\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)
   b. \( P\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \& P\neg\max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \)
   ‘The speaker doesn’t know whether the paper is exactly 10pp long or whether the paper is less than 10pp long.’

The neo-Gricean analysis thus accounts for the fact that unembedded occurrences of superlative modifiers give rise to ignorance inferences. It also makes certain predictions for the interaction of superlative modifiers with modals, which are discussed in the following subsections.

2.2. Interaction of superlative modifiers with necessity modals
Since superlative modifiers are analyzed as degree operators, two different scope orders are
possible when they interact with modals. If a superlative modifier is interpreted in the scope of a necessity modal, the stronger scalar alternatives in (26) are not symmetric. That is, they can simultaneously be false while the assertion is true. For example (24) this is the case if the permissible paper length corresponds to a range including 10pp and more. Because the alternatives are not symmetric, primary implicatures get strengthened to scalar implicatures in Sauerland’s (2004) system, as shown in (27).

(24) The paper **has to** be **at least** 10 pages long.

(25) a. has to [[at least 10pp] λd [the paper be d long]]
    □ > at least

   b. □ max {d: long(p,d)} ≥ 10pp
    ‘In all the acceptable worlds, the length of the paper is 10pp or more.’

(26) Stronger scalar alternatives:
    a. □ max {d: long(p,d)} = 10pp
       at least ≠ exactly
    ‘In all the acceptable worlds, the length of the paper is exactly 10pp.’
    b. □ max {d: long(p,d)} ≥ 11pp <=>*
       10pp ≠ 11pp
    □ max {d: long(p,d)} > 10pp
    ‘In all the acceptable worlds, the paper is longer than 10pp.’

(27) a. Assertion: K □ max {d: long(p,d)} ≥ 10

   b. Primary implicatures: ¬K □ max {d: long(p,d)} = 10pp
      ¬K □ max {d: long(p,d)} > 10pp
   c. Scalar implicatures: K¬ □ max {d: long(p,d)} = 10pp
      K¬ □ max {d: long(p,d)} > 10pp

According to the scalar implicatures generated, the speaker is sure that the paper does not have to be exactly 10pp long and that the paper does not have to be more than 10pp long. Together with the asserted content this is true iff the permissible paper lengths correspond to a range of values whose lower bound is 10pp. This corresponds to the authoritative reading illustrated in (28).

(28) [-------------] authoritive reading

If a superlative modifier takes wide scope over a necessity modal, the speaker insecurity
reading results. Although the scope order \textit{at least} \(>\) \(\Box\) is truth-conditionally equivalent to \(\Box\) \(>\) \textit{at least} (see Heim 2000), the pragmatic reasoning is different. Because wide scope of \textit{at least} and \textit{exactly} in the alternatives leads to symmetric alternatives – just as in the case of unembedded occurrences – ignorance inferences rather than scalar implicatures are generated.

(29) a. [at least 10pp] \(\lambda d\) [ has to [the paper be d long]] &\textit{at least} \(>\) \(\Box\)

b. \(\max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq 10\text{pp}\)

\textquote{The minimally required length of the paper is 10pp or more.}'

(30) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. \(\max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}\) &\textit{at least} \(\Rightarrow\) \textit{exactly}

\textquote{The minimally required length of the paper is exactly 10pp.}'

b. \(\max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq 11\text{pp} \Leftrightarrow* \max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp}\) &\textit{10pp} \(\Rightarrow\) \textit{11pp}

\textquote{The minimally required length of the paper is more than 10pp.}'

(31) Ignorance implicatures generated:

a. \(P \max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \& P \neg \max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}\)

b. \(P \max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp} \& P \neg \max\{d: \Box \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp}\)

These ignorance implicatures express that the speaker is unsure about the minimally required length of the paper; she does not know whether it is exactly 10pp or more than 10pp. Together with the asserted content, this corresponds to the speaker insecurity reading.

(32) \textquote{---------------------------speaker insecurity reading}

Under the neo-Gricean account the two readings of sentences with a necessity modal and \textit{at least} come down to a difference in scope: The authoritative reading arises if the superlative modifier is interpreted in scope of the necessity modal, and the speaker insecurity reading results from wide scope of the superlative modifier. As evidence for this scopal ambiguity, Büring (2008) observes that only the authoritative reading is available if movement of \textit{at least} over the modal is blocked for independent reasons, in particular if \textit{at least} is contained within a finite clause. Sentence (34) only has the authoritative reading (28), and the speaker insecurity reading (32) is absent. It thus contrasts with the minimally different (24), where \textit{at least} occurs in an infinitival and both readings are available.
(33) It is **required** that the paper be **at least** 10 pages long.

The derivations for **at most** are again parallel to those for **at least**. If **at most** takes narrow scope under the necessity modal the stronger scalar alternatives are not symmetric and the authoritative reading is derived, as shown in (35) to (38).

(34) The paper **has to** be **at most** 10 pages long.

(35) a. has to [[at most 10pp] λd [the paper be d long]]

b. □ max{d: long(p,d)} ≤ 10pp

‘In all the acceptable worlds, the length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(36) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. □ max{d: long(p,d)} = 10pp

‘In all the acceptable worlds, the length of the paper is exactly 10pp.’

b. □ max{d: long(p,d)} ≤ 9pp \(\iff\) 10pp \(\Rightarrow\) 9pp

‘In all the acceptable worlds, the paper is shorter than 10pp.’

(37) Scalar implicatures generated:

a. K¬□ max{d: long(p,d)} = 10pp

b. K¬□ max{d: long(p,d)} < 10pp

‘The speaker is sure that the paper doesn’t have to be exactly 10pp long and that the paper doesn’t have to be less than 10pp long.’

(38) \[\text{authoritative reading}\]

If **at most** takes wide scope, the stronger scalar alternatives are symmetric and the speaker insecurity reading is derived, as shown in (39) to (42).

(39) a. [at most 10pp] [ λd [ has to [the paper be d long]]]

b. max{d: □ long(p,d)} ≤ 10pp

‘The minimally required length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(40) Stronger scalar alternatives:
a. \( \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)

   ‘The minimally required length of the paper is exactly 10pp.’

b. \( \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 9\text{pp} \)

   \( \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \)

   ‘The minimally required length of the paper is less than 10pp.’

(41) Ignorance implicatures generated:

a. \( P \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \land P \neg \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \)

b. \( P \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \land P \neg \max\{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \)

   ‘The speaker doesn’t know whether the minimally required length of the paper is exactly 10pp or whether the minimally required length of the paper is less than 10pp.’

(42) \( \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \boxslash \) speaker insecurity reading

In general, ignorance inferences are obviated if a superlative modifier is interpreted in the scope of an operator that breaks symmetry. This arguably also accounts for other cases of ignorance obviation, e.g. under universal quantifiers (SCHWARZ, 2011) and generics (NOUWEN 2010). However, we will see in the next section that a possibility modal does not break symmetry.

### 2.3. Interaction of superlative modifiers with possibility modals

While we just saw that a necessity modal breaks symmetry if a superlative modifier is interpreted in its scope and scalar rather than ignorance implicatures arise, a possibility modal does not break symmetry. Even if the possibility modal takes wide scope over a superlative modifier, the stronger scalar alternatives cannot simultaneously be false while the assertion is true. Therefore ignorance inferences are generated. This is shown in the following for *at most* (the derivations for *at least* are again parallel).

If *at most* is interpreted in the scope of the modal as in (44), a reading results which is weak for several reasons. For one thing the truth conditions merely say that there is an acceptable world where the length of the paper is 10pp or less. This allows for other lengths also being permissible.

(43) The paper can be at most 10 pages long.

(44) a. can \([\text{at most } 10\text{pp}] [\lambda d [\text{the paper be } d \text{ long}]]\) \( \diamond > \text{at most} \)
b. $\Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 10\text{pp}$
   ‘There is an acceptable world where the length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

In the pragmatic component, strong ignorance inferences are generated:

(45) Stronger scalar alternatives:
   a. $\Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}$  
      ‘There is an acceptable world where the length of the paper is exactly 10pp.’
   b. $\Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 9\text{pp}$  
      $\iff_{*}$  
      $10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp}$
      ‘There is an acceptable world where the length of the paper is less than 10pp.’

(46) Ignorance inferences generated:
   a. $P \Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp} \& P \neg \Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}$
   b. $P \Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp} \& P \neg \Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp}$

According to these ignorance inferences the speaker does not know whether the paper can be exactly 10pp long or whether the paper can be less than 10pp long. Thus for all the speaker knows, the maximally allowed length might be 5pp or the minimally required length might be 10pp. Since this does not exclude a lot of epistemic alternatives, this reading is very weak. This weak reading might not be detectable because there is another reading with stronger truth conditions and sensible ignorance inferences, derived from an LF where the superlative modifier takes wide scope as in (47):

(47) a. $[\text{at most } 10\text{pp}] \lambda d [\text{allowed } [\text{the paper be } d \text{ long}]]$  
   b. $\max\{d: \Diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 10\text{pp}$
   ‘The maximally allowed length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(48) Stronger scalar alternatives:
   a. $\max\{d: \Diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}$  
      ‘The maximally allowed length of the paper is exactly 10pp.’
   b. $\max\{d: \Diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 9\text{pp}$  
      $\iff_{*}$  
      $10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp}$
      $\max\{d: \Diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} < 10\text{pp}$
   ‘The maximally allowed length of the paper is less than 10pp.’

(49) Ignorance implicatures generated:
2.4. Summary of predictions of the neo-Gricean account

In sum, the neo-Gricean account of ignorance inferences makes the following predictions regarding the interaction of superlative modifiers with modals: If at least or at most are interpreted with wide scope over a necessity or possibility modal, the speaker insecurity reading results. The authoritative reading results if at least or at most are interpreted in the scope of a necessity modal. Narrow scope under a possibility modal leads to a reading with strong ignorance inferences.

This correctly accounts for the readings observed for at least. At least gives rise to an authoritative reading in combination with a necessity modal, but not in combination with a possibility modal. At most, in contrast, gives rise to an authoritative split reading in combination with a possibility modal. While the truth-conditions derived from an LF where at most takes wide scope correspond to the split reading excluding worlds where the paper is longer than 10pp, the reading is not authoritative because ignorance inferences are generated in the pragmatic component. Therefore the neo-Gricean analysis, while successful for at least, does not account for the interaction of at most and modals.

3. A decompositional analysis of at most

3.1. Decomposing at most

In order to account for the split reading arising with at most and the particular pattern of interaction with modals, I propose that at most is morpho-syntactically complex. This follows the idea that negative antonyms are generally decomposed in the syntax into an antonymizing operator and the corresponding positive antonym (HEIM 2006, 2008; BÜRING 2007; ALXATIB 2013). In this spirit, I propose that at most n is decomposed into an antonymizing operator...
ANT and at least n:

(51) \[ \text{at most } n = [(n-\text{ANT})_d, \text{at least})_{dt}] \]

As meaning for at least I adopt the degree operator semantics proposed by \textsc{Schwarz} (2011) and \textsc{Kennedy} (2013), repeated as (52).

(52) \[ [[\text{at least}]] = \lambda d. \lambda D_d. \text{max}(D) \geq d \]

For the semantics of the antonymizing operator ANT, an obvious candidate would be Heim’s (2006) degree operator little (see also Alxatib 2013). Heim uses this meaning of little to account for the split reading of sentences like the following:

(53) We can grow very little before we run out of space. \hspace{1cm} [Heim 2006]

‘It is not possible for us to grow more than very little before we run out of space.’

Little, defined as in (54), expresses degree negation and means that a degree property D does not hold to degree d. The split reading of sentence (53) results from the LF where little takes inverse scope over the modal.

(54) \[ [[\text{little}]] = \lambda d. \lambda D_d. \neg D(d) \]

With this meaning of little, however, at most n cannot be decomposed into little plus at least n, but would rather correspond to little plus more than n, which is not in line with the idea that negative antonyms involve their positive counterparts. But a revision of Heim’s definition of little is needed for independent reasons (see also \textsc{Beck} 2012). Consider sentence (55), where that serves as direct degree argument of weigh and anaphorically picks up the measure phrase 40kg. With the definition of little in (54) the truth conditions in (56b) are derived, according to which Sue weighs less than 40kg. But (55) is intuitively perfectly compatible with Sue weighing exactly 40kg. Thus, (56b) does not correctly render the meaning of the sentence.

(55) [Mary only weighs 40kg.] Sue weighs that little too.

(56) a. [that little] [\lambda d. [ Sue weighs d-much]]

\hspace{1cm} b. \neg[[\text{weight}(s) \geq 40kg]] = \text{weight}(s) < 40kg

In order to derive the correct meaning for sentence (55), we need a definition of little in
which only higher degrees are negated, but not the degree contributed by the first argument:

\[(\text{little}_2) = \lambda d. \lambda D. \forall d' > d: \neg D(d')\]

With this revised definition we get the truth conditions (58b), according to which Sue does not weigh more than 40kg. After strengthening by scalar implicature the meaning is that Sue’s weight is exactly 40kg, which correctly captures the meaning of sentence (55). \(^4\)

\[(\text{58})\]
\[\begin{array}{l}
a. \ \text{[that little}_2]\ [\lambda d\ [\text{Sue weighs } d\text{-much}]] \\
b. \ \forall d' > 40kg: \neg [\text{WEIGHT(s)} \geq d'] = \\
\quad \neg [\text{WEIGHT(s)} > 40kg]
\end{array}\]

I thus use this revised definition of little as the meaning of the antonymizing operator \(\text{ANT}\). Note that this renders the antonymizing operator \(\text{ANT}\) equivalent to the straightforward definition of \(\text{at most}\) repeated from (13b) above (see also BECK 2012).

\[(\text{59})\]
\[\text{[ANT]} = \lambda d. \lambda D. \forall d' > d: \neg D(d')\]

\[(13b)\]
\[\text{[at most]} = \lambda d. \lambda D. \text{max}(D) \leq d\]

### 3.2. Alternatives and ignorance inferences of \(\text{at most}\)

With these assumptions about the semantics of \(\text{at most}\), let us now turn to the question what consequences the decompositional analysis has in the pragmatics. In particular the question needs to be addressed what the scalar alternatives are for an utterance with \(\text{at most}\). In this respect I follow KATZIR (2007) and FOX & KATZIR (2011), who argue that alternatives are structurally defined and generated by substitution of lexical categories and deletion. In particular, I assume that the scalar alternatives for an utterance with \(\text{at most}\) are generated by (i) substituting numerals or measure phrases by each other; (ii) substituting \(\text{at least}\) by exactly (see SCHWARZ 2011) and (iii) deleting \(\text{ANT}\) (see ALXATIB 2013). In addition, I adopt the common assumption that modals are substituted in the alternatives.

With these assumptions about the meaning of \(\text{at most}\) and scalar alternatives, ignorance inferences for unembedded occurrences of \(\text{at most}\) are generated in the same way as above: the stronger scalar alternatives, which are the same as under SCHWARZ’ (2011)

---

\(^4\) See RETT (2007) on how to derive the fact that negative antonyms are generally evaluative, e.g. that (55) conveys that 40kg falls below the standard weight of women comparable to Sue. Incidentally, for RETT’s analysis to work, the antonymizing operator needs to be defined as in (57) rather than as in (54).
analysis, are symmetric and thus ignorance inferences are generated. This is illustrated in the following for sentence (60).

(60) The paper is **at most** 10 pages long.

(61) a. **ANT-10pp [λd₂ [at least-d₂ [λd₁ [the paper is d₁-long]]]]**

   b. ∀d’ > 10pp: ¬ [max{d: long(p,d)} ≥ d] =>

      ¬ max{d: long(p,d)} > 10pp

(62) Scalar alternatives:

   The paper is *Pol NumMod n* pages long.

   where *Pol* ∈ { ANT, ∅ }

   *NumMod* ∈ { at least, exactly }

   n ∈ { …, 9, 10, 11, …}

(63) Stronger scalar alternatives:

   a. The paper is **exactly** 10 pages long.  
      
      max{d: long(p,d)} = 10pp

   b. The paper is at **most** 9 pages long.  
      
      ¬ max{d: long(p,d)} > 9pp  <=*>

      ¬ max{d: long(p,d)} < 10pp

(64) Ignorance inferences generated:

   a. P max{d: long(p,d)} = 10pp & P ¬ max{d: long(p,d)} = 10pp

   b. P max{d: long(p,d)} < 10pp & P ¬ max{d: long(p,d)} < 10pp

   ‘The speaker isn’t sure whether the paper is exactly 10pp long or whether the paper is less than 10pp long.’

3.3. Interaction of *at most* with possibility modals

In the discussion of the interaction of *at most* with modals, let us start with possibility modals, for which the basic neo-Gricean account cannot derive the attested split reading. Recall that the split reading, which is the most prominent reading of sentence (65), is authoritative and expresses prohibition of the paper being longer than 10pp. Under the decompositional analysis of *at most*, the three different scope orders in (66) are possible for this sentence.

(65) The paper **can** be **at most** 10 pages long.
Crucially, the decompositional analysis makes available the LF (66c) where \textsc{ant} takes wide and \textit{at least} takes narrow scope with respect to the modal. Under this scope order the alternatives are not symmetric and thus scalar implicatures are generated resulting in the authoritative reading, as shown in detail in the following.

This LF already looks promising in terms of its truth conditions, according to which the paper is not allowed to be longer than 10pp. This is definitely part of the meaning intuitively conveyed by sentence (65) under the split reading. In addition, pragmatic inferences arise by considering the scalar alternatives of the following form:

We now have to consider eight scalar alternatives. It turns out that out of these, only the two shown in (69) asymmetrically entail the assertion.\(^5\)

Crucially, the alternative (69a) generated by substituting the numeral with a lower value does not have a symmetric counterpart. This is due to the fact that \textsc{ant}, which has the

\(^5\) In fact, the alternative derived by substituting \textit{at least} by \textit{exactly} and 10\textit{pp} by 9\textit{pp} is equivalent to (69a). In case of equivalent alternatives, I only consider the one requiring the fewest substitutions.
semantics attributed by SCHWARZ (2011) to at most, can be deleted in the alternatives but not substituted by exactly. The alternative (69a) thus leads to the scalar implicature (70a), according to which the speaker is sure that the paper can be more than 9pp long. In addition, the alternative (69b) also leads to a scalar implicature (70b), according to which the speaker is sure that the paper does not have to be exactly 10pp long.

(70) Scalar implicatures generated:

a. $K \Diamond \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 9\text{pp}$
b. $K \neg \Box \max\{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10\text{pp}$

Taken together, the assertion and the scalar implicatures express that the permissible paper lengths correspond to a range of values whose upper bound is 10pp. In other words, we derive the authoritative reading (71) which corresponds to the split reading of (65).

(71) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{authoritative reading} \\
10\text{pp}
\end{array}
\]

This shows that the decompositional analysis can derive the split (authoritative) reading for the combination of at most with a possibility modal, which other analyses fail to account for. In the analysis I propose, the split reading is derived from an LF where $\text{ANT}$ takes wide scope. This leads to the prediction that the split (authoritative) reading should not be available if movement out of the scope of the modal is blocked for independent reasons. Evidence that this prediction is borne out comes from sentences like (72), where at most is embedded in a finite clause. While the sentence is less than perfect and hard to interpret, it seems clear that it does not have the split (authoritative) reading, according to which 10pp is the maximally allowed length of the paper.\footnote{The absence of the authoritative reading if wide scope of the modal is enforced also provides an argument against attributing obviation of ignorance inferences under possibility modals to a Free Choice effect (see COPPOCK & BROCHHAGEN 2013 and NOUWEN (to appear) for proposals in this direction). Current analyses of Free Choice effects arising with disjunction and indefinites (FOX 2007 among others) derive Free Choice permission readings from an LF where the possibility modal takes wide scope. If the authoritative reading of at most was due to a Free Choice effect, then the fact that (72) does not have the authoritative reading is unexpected.}

(72) It is permitted that the paper is at most 10 pages long.

In addition to the split authoritative reading, the other two readings that the basic neo-Gricean approach discussed in section 2 derives are also generated from the other two available LFs (66a) and (66b). In general, if $\text{ANT}$ and at least take adjacent scope, the same
pragmatic inferences and readings are derived as for SCHWARZ’ (2011) non-decomposed at most. If both \textit{ANT} and \textit{at least} are interpreted in the scope of the possibility modal, we get the same symmetric stronger alternatives (74a) and (74b) as in (45). These lead to the ignorance inferences (75), which are strong and do not seem to correspond to an attested reading. Because we now also consider alternatives which are generated by replacing the possibility modal with a necessity modal, we also derive the scalar implicatures (76) on the basis of the non-symmetric stronger alternatives (74c) and (74d).

(73) a. can \([\text{ANT-}10\text{pp } \lambda d_2 \ [ \text{at least-}d_2 \ [ \lambda d_1 \ [ \text{the paper be } d_1\text{-long}] ]]]\] \(\Diamond > \text{ANT} > \text{at least} \)

b. \(\Diamond \forall d' > 10\text{pp} : \neg [\max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \geq d'\}] \iff \)
\(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \leq 10\text{pp} \)

‘There is an acceptable world where the length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(74) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. \(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \leq 9\text{pp} \iff \ast\) \(10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp} \)
\(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \leq 10\text{pp} \)

b. \(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \) \(\text{ANT, at least } \Rightarrow \text{ exactly} \)

c. \(\Box \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} \leq 10\text{pp} \)

\(\Diamond \text{ } \Rightarrow \Box \)

d. \(\Box \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \) \(\text{ANT, } \Diamond \text{ } \Rightarrow \Box, \text{ at least } \Rightarrow \text{ exactly} \)

(75) Ignorance Inferences generated:

a. P \(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \) \& P \(\neg \Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \)

b. P \(\Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \) \& P \(\neg \Diamond \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \)

‘The speaker does not know whether the paper is allowed to be exactly 10pp long and whether the paper is allowed to be less than 10pp long.’

(76) Scalar implicatures generated:

a. K \(\neg \Box \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} \leq 10\text{pp} \)

b. K \(\neg \Box \max \{d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \)

‘The speaker is sure that the paper does not have to be exactly 10pp long and that the paper doesn’t have to be 10pp long or shorter.’

The speaker insecurity reading is derived from the LF (66b), where both \textit{ANT} and \textit{at least} take scope under the possibility modal. In this case, the derivation is completely parallel to (47)-(49) above: There are two symmetric stronger alternatives, which lead to
ignorance implicatures.

(77) a. **ANT-10pp** [\(\lambda d_2 [\text{at least-}d_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{can [the paper be } d_1\text{-long]]}]]\)]  \(\text{ANT} > \text{at least} > \diamond\)

b. \(\forall d' > 10\text{pp}: \neg [\text{max\{}d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq d'] \iff\)

\(\neg [\text{max\{}d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10\text{pp}] \iff\)

\(\text{max\{}d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 10\text{pp}\)

‘The maximally allowed length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(78) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. \(\text{max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} \leq 9\text{pp} \iff\)^

\(10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp}\)

\(\text{max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} < 10\text{pp}\)

b. \(\text{max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} = 10\text{ pp} \iff\)

\(\text{ANT, at least} \Rightarrow \text{exactly}\)

(79) Ignorance inferences generated:

a. \(\text{P max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} = 10\text{pp} \& \text{P } \neg \text{max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} = 10\text{pp}\)

b. \(\text{P max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} < 10\text{pp} \& \text{P } \neg \text{max\}{d: \diamond \text{long}(p,d)} < 10\text{pp}\)

‘The speaker is not sure whether the maximally allowed length is exactly 10pp or less than 10pp.’

(80)  

-------------/////////

10pp

speaker insecurity reading

3.4. Interaction of *at most* with necessity modals

To complete the discussion of the readings the decompositional analysis makes available, we also need to re-consider the interaction of *at most* with a necessity modal, as in (81). Crucially, we need to make sure that we do not derive an unattested split-scope reading granting permission for the paper to be 10pp or shorter. The three scope orders in (82) have to be considered.

(81) The paper **has to** be **at most** 10 pages long.

(82) a. \(\text{has to } [\text{ANT-10 } [\lambda d_2 [\text{at least-}d_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{the paper be } d_1\text{-long}]]]]]\)

\(\Box > \text{ANT} > \text{at least}\)

b. \(\text{ANT-10 } [\lambda d_2 [\text{at least-}d_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{has to [the paper be } d_1\text{-long}]]]]]\)

\(\text{ANT} > \text{at least} > \Box\)

c. \(\text{ANT-10 } [\lambda d_2 [\text{has to [ at least-}d_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{the paper be } d_1\text{-long}]]]]]\)

\(\text{ANT} > \Box > \text{at least}\)

The LF (82c) would seem to be the basis for the split scope reading, which is in fact not attested. But while the truth-conditions (83b) express permission for the paper to be no
longer than 10pp, strong ignorance inferences based on the symmetric alternatives (84a) and (84b) are generated in the pragmatic component. As before, I assume that the strong ignorance reading is masked by the existence of the speaker insecurity reading with sensible ignorance inferences.

(83)  a. \text{ANT-10pp} [\lambda d_2 [\text{has to} [\text{at least-d}_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{the paper be d}_1-\text{long}]]]]] \text{ANT} > \square > \text{at least}

b. \forall d' > 10pp: \neg \square \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq d \iff 
\neg \square \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10pp

‘The paper does not have to be more than 10pp long.’

(84) Stronger scalar alternatives:

a. \neg \square \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 9pp \hspace{1cm} 10pp \Rightarrow 9pp

b. \Diamond \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10pp \hspace{1cm} \text{ANT, } \square \Rightarrow \Diamond, \text{ at least } \Rightarrow \text{ exactly}

c. \neg \Diamond [\max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10pp] \hspace{1cm} \square \Rightarrow \Diamond

(85) Ignorance inferences generated:

a. P \neg \square \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 9pp \& P \square \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 9pp

b. P \Diamond \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10pp \& P \neg \Diamond \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} = 10pp

‘The speaker is not sure whether the paper is required to be longer than 9pp and she is not sure whether the paper is allowed to be exactly 10pp long.’

(86) Scalar implicature generated:

K \Diamond \max \{d: \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10pp

‘The speaker is sure that the paper is allowed to be longer than 10pp.’

The speaker insecurity reading is derived from the LF where \text{ANT} and \text{at least} take adjacent scope over the modal (which makes the derivation again equivalent to the one for non-decomposed \text{at most}): 

(87)  a. \text{ANT-10pp} [\lambda d_2 [\text{at least-d}_2 [\lambda d_1 [\text{has to} [\text{the paper be d}_1-\text{long}]]]]] \text{ANT} > \text{at least} > \square

b. \forall d' > 10pp: \neg [\max \{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} \geq d'] \iff 
\neg [\max \{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} > 10pp] \iff 
\max \{d: \square \text{long}(p,d)\} \leq 10pp

‘The minimally required length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(88) Relevant scalar alternatives:
a. \( \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} \leq 9\text{pp} \quad \iff^{*} \quad 10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp} \)
\[ \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \]

b. \( \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \quad \text{\textit{ANT}, at least } \Rightarrow \text{ exactly} \)

(89) Ignorance inferences generated:
a. \( P \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \) \& \( P \neg \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \)
b. \( P \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \) \& \( P \neg \max \{ d : \square \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \)

‘The speaker is not sure whether the minimally required length is exactly 10pp or less than 10pp.’

(90) 

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{speaker insecurity reading} \\
\hline
10\text{pp}
\end{array}
\]

Finally, if both \textit{ANT} and \textit{at least} are interpreted in the scope of the necessity modal, the authoritative reading results:

(91) a. \( \text{has to } \left[ \text{\textit{ANT}-10pp} \left[ \lambda d_2 \left[ \text{\textit{at least}-d_2} \left[ \lambda d_1 \left[ \text{the paper be d}_1\text{-long} \right] \right] \right] \right] \right] \square \Rightarrow \text{\textit{ANT} } \Rightarrow \text{\textit{at least}} \)
b. \( \square \forall d' > 10\text{pp} : \neg [\max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} \geq d'] \quad \iff \)
\[ \square \neg [\max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} > 10\text{pp}] \iff \]
\[ \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} \leq 10\text{pp} \]

‘In every acceptable world, the length of the paper is 10pp or less.’

(92) Stronger scalar alternatives:
a. \( \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} \leq 9\text{pp} \quad \iff^{*} \quad 10\text{pp} \Rightarrow 9\text{pp} \)
\[ \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \]

b. \( \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \quad \text{\textit{ANT}, at least } \Rightarrow \text{ exactly} \)

(93) Scalar implicatures generated:
a. \( K \neg \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} < 10\text{pp} \)
b. \( K \neg \square \max \{ d : \text{long}(p,d) \} = 10\text{pp} \)

‘The speaker is sure that the paper does not have to be less than 10pp long and that the paper does not have to be exactly 10pp long.’

(94) 

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{authoritative reading} \\
\hline
10\text{pp}
\end{array}
\]

The decompositional analysis thus inherits from the neo-Gricean account the prediction that
for the combination of *at most* with a necessity modal both the speaker insecurity and the authoritative reading is available. But intuitively only the speaker insecurity reading seems to be possible for sentence (81). Thus the approach seems to overgenerate readings. But the unavailability of the authoritative reading of (81) might in fact be due to independent factors. It is instructive to observe that the authoritative reading is readily available if *at most* is embedded in a finite clause under a necessity modal. This is illustrated by the sentences in (95) gathered from the internet. Intuitively, they do not express speaker ignorance, but rather report or set the upper bound of the range of permissible values:

(95) a. [I am looking for suggestions for a dorm room microwave for my son.] The college *requires* that it be at most 1 cu feet in volume and at most 800 Watts.\(^7\) ‘1 cu feet is the maximally allowed volume and 800 Watts is the maximally allowed power.’

b. This algorithm *requires* that variables be used at most once.\(^8\) ‘The maximally allowed number of variable uses is one.’

Data like (95) suggest that the authoritative reading is in fact available (and the only reading possible) if there is no choice but to interpret the modal with widest scope. Thus, I take it to be a welcome prediction that wide scope of a necessity modal results in the authoritative reading.

The question remains, however, why the authoritative reading does not seem to be available when *at most* is contained within an infinitival complement of a necessity modal as in (81). A way to explain this could be to relate the scopal interaction of modals vis-à-vis the antonymizing operator to the one they show vis-à-vis sentential negation. It is well-known that modals show specific scope preferences vis-à-vis sentential negation. Since the modal verb *have to* in (81) takes narrow scope with respect to negation (see e.g. IATRIDOU & ZEIJLSTRA 2009), this would also predict that *have to* takes narrow scope with respect to ANT, making the authoritative reading unavailable. If this explanation is on the right track, we would observe an interesting parallel between degree negation and sentential negation in the interaction with modals.

To summarize the discussion of the readings when *at most* is combined with a necessity modal, the decompositional analysis derives the speaker insecurity and the

---


authoritative reading. The fact that the authoritative reading does in many cases not show up is likely to be attributable to independent reasons. As desired, it is not possible to derive a split (authoritative) reading for this combination.

4. A unified analysis of split scope?
This paper started from the observation that a split scope reading arises if at most is combined with a possibility modal, but not if it is combined with a necessity modal. This sets at most apart from other downward monotonic quantifiers like negative indefinites and numerals modified by fewer than, which show no asymmetry in terms of split readings across the two types of modals. An investigation of at most can therefore provide important evidence for the adequate analysis of split scope, and in particular contribute to the debate whether split scope of all downward monotonic quantifiers should receive the same analysis.

The asymmetry between possibility and necessity modals is unexpected under unified accounts of split scope readings (DE SWART 2000 and ABELS & MARTÍ 2010) since they apply independently of the type of modal. But the asymmetry can be explained under the analysis I propose, where at most is decomposed into an antonymizing operator and at least. This provides an argument for deriving split readings arising with different quantifiers in a case-by-case fashion. Decomposing e.g. negative indefinites into a sentential negation and an indefinite (PENKA 2011 among others), and comparative quantifiers into a comparative operator and a quantificational part (HACKL, 2000) allows for accounting for the particular patterns of split readings these quantifiers exhibit.

In principle, it would be possible to extend the analysis in terms of an antonymizing operator to other quantifiers exhibiting split scope readings. The negative determiner no, for instance, could be analyzed as meaning ‘no more than zero’ and consisting of the antonymizing operator and HACKL’S (2000) gradable determiner MANY, as shown in (96). Sentence (97a) would then receive the truth conditions (97b) saying that there does not exist a set consisting of students who failed with a cardinality greater than zero.

\[
\text{(96) a. } no = \left[\left[0\text{-ANT}\right]_{d(d)}^\text{d(dt)}\text{ MANY}_{d((et)(et))}\right]
\]

\[
\text{(97) a. No student failed.}
\]
\[
\text{b. } \forall d > 0: \neg \exists X [ [X] = d \& \text{ students}(X) \& \text{ failed}(X)]
\]

But although theoretically possible, such an analysis for negative indefinites does not seem
adequate. In contrast to numerals modified by *at most* or *fewer than*, negative indefinites do not display overt degree morphology. Hence analysing them in terms of degree semantics does not seem justified if the morpho-syntactic composition of quantifiers is taken seriously. Moreover, negative indefinites in many languages show an interaction with sentential negation and give rise to negative concord. Thus, relating them to sentential negation seems more adequate than relating them to the antonymizing operator.

These considerations point to the conclusion that split scope of different types of downward monotonic quantifiers should not be subsumed under a unified analysis but rather be analysed in a case-by-case fashion.

5. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to account for the specific pattern of interaction with modals that *at most* exhibits in terms of split scope readings. Split scope readings are available for *at most* in combination with possibility modals, but not necessity modals. Embedding the discussion of split scope readings of *at most* in the recent semantic and pragmatic literature on superlative modifiers, it was noted that the split reading of *at most* under possibility modals is authoritative where the ignorance inferences usually triggered by superlative modifiers are obviated.

I showed that a decompositional analysis, where *at most* is decomposed into an antonymizing operator, defined in terms of degree negation, and *at least* successfully accounts for the interaction of *at most* with modals. The analysis explains the fact that *at most* gives rise to ignorance inferences when it occurs unembedded or in combination with a necessity modal, but can obviate ignorance inferences in combination with a possibility modal to yield an authoritative split reading. For the derivation of ignorance inferences, I built on the neo-Gricean approach, which successfully accounts for the interaction of *at least* with modals, but in its basic version fails for *at most*. I argued that the split (authoritative) reading across possibility modals can be derived if the neo-Gricean approach is supplemented with the assumption that *at most* is morpho-syntactically complex and consists of an antonymizing operator and *at least*.

The particular pattern of interaction with modals which *at most* exhibits thus lends support to the idea that negative antonyms are decomposed in the syntax into an antonymizing operator, defined in terms of degree negation, and the corresponding positive antonym. This pattern of interaction also has consequences for the question what triggers this
decomposition, or putting it differently, which element of a pair of antonyms should be analysed as the negative one. For the antonym pair $at least — at most$ it seems that semantic rather than morphological properties are decisive. The evidence coming from the interaction with modals suggests that it is $at most$ which is more complex and composed of the antonymizing operator, rather than $at least$, although the former is morphologically based on the positive form $much$ and the latter on the negative form $little$. It might seem that $at least$ is the more likely candidate for decomposition, since it already contains $little$, which is semantically equivalent to the antonymizing operator. But the readings that are available in combination with modals suggest that it is the downward monotonic modifier $at most$ that involves the antonymizing operator.

In sum, the investigation of split readings of $at most$ in this paper contributes to current debates in the semantics and pragmatics literature in several respects. First, it lends support to the idea that negative antonyms are decomposed in the syntax into an antonymizing operator, defined in terms of degree negation, and the corresponding positive antonym. Second, it shows that a pragmatic account of the ignorance inferences of superlative modifiers can explain the $prima facie$ puzzling interaction of $at least$ and $at most$ with modals. Finally, it provides evidence against a unified analysis of split scope readings and in favour of a case-by-case analysis for different types of downward monotonic quantifiers.

References


Schwarz, Bernhard (2011): Remarks on Class B numeral modifiers. Handout of a talk at the workshop Indefinites and Beyond, Universität Göttingen, November 19, 2011.